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Comparative Analysis of Apprenticeship Training  
in France and Germany 
Clément Brébion 
Abstract 
This paper is a comparative analysis of apprenticeship training in France and Germany. It 
relies on the German Socio-Economic Panel and the Enquêtes Génération. I find that 
apprenticeship training is associated with a stronger advantage over full-time students in 
France than in Germany at the secondary education level while no causal effect can be 
evidenced among students exiting higher education in both countries. I bring elements of 
proof suggesting that, at the secondary level, the average apprentices’ advantage on the 
labour market follows a divergent pattern in the two countries. In Germany, it mostly stems 
from a high retention rate from the training firms’ part whereas, in France, the advantage of 
apprentices is also rooted in their position on firms’ external labour market. These results 
allow me to discuss the literature of the Aix School and of the Varieties of Capitalism. 
Keywords: apprenticeship training, youth unemployment, France, Germany, international 
comparison 
JEL Codes: J24; I26; C36 
UNE ANALYSE COMPARATIVE DE L’EFFICACITÉ  
DE L’APPRENTISSAGE EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article est une analyse comparative de l’efficacité des études en apprentissage en France 
et en Allemagne. Les données utilisées sont celles du German Socio-Economic Panel pour 
l’Allemagne et des enquêtes Génération pour la France. On montre qu’avoir suivi un 
apprentissage est associé à un avantage plus fort sur les sortants d’études à temps plein en 
France qu’en Allemagne à la sortie du secondaire. À la sortie du supérieur, aucun effet causal 
n’est observé dans les deux pays. On apporte des éléments de preuve suggérant qu’en sortie 
de secondaire, l’avantage moyen des apprentis sur les étudiants à temps plein suit un schéma 
différent dans les deux pays. En Allemagne, il est principalement expliqué par des hauts 
niveaux de rétention des apprentis par les entreprises de formation, tandis qu’en France il est 
également issu de la position favorable des anciens apprentis sur le marché du travail externe. 
Ces résultats permettent une discussion de la littérature de l’école d’Aix et de celle des 
Variétés du Capitalisme. 
Mots-clefs : études en apprentissage, chômage des jeunes, France, Allemagne, comparaison 
internationale.
 

SYNTHÈSE DES PRINCIPAUX RÉSULTATS 
Face à un taux de chômage des jeunes élevé, bon nombre de pays européens, dont la 
France, tournent leur regard vers les pays germaniques (Allemagne, Autriche…) où la 
situation demeure plus favorable pour les jeunes. Un large consensus s’est installé dans le 
débat public présentant l’apprentissage comme un élément fondamental de la réussite de ces 
pays.  
La littérature scientifique a effectivement démontré qu’un système d’apprentissage 
développé est fortement corrélé à un faible niveau de chômage des jeunes. C’est le cas en 
Allemagne où plus de la moitié des élèves passent par le système dual (i.e. l’apprentissage) et 
où le taux de chômage des 15-24 ans n’a pas dépassé 15,6 % depuis la réunification. En 
France, où le taux de chômage des jeunes n’est jamais descendu à ce niveau dans la même 
période et où la proportion de jeunes passant par l’apprentissage est deux fois moindre, une 
volonté politique a donc vu le jour pour accroître le nombre d’étudiants formés en 
apprentissage. L’objectif de 500 000 apprentis réaffirmé par différentes majorités 
gouvernementales depuis 1993 n’a cependant toujours pas pu être atteint. De fait, le discours 
s’est graduellement déplacé. Plutôt qu’une simple augmentation du nombre d’apprentis, 
c’est dorénavant un transfert plus général de l’organisation du système de formation 
allemand qui est espéré (moins de matières générales dans la partie scolaire de 
l’apprentissage, par exemple). Ceci, avec l’idée souvent implicite que l’apprentissage en 
Allemagne assurerait une meilleure transition sur le marché du travail qu’en France. Si des 
études ont démontré que l’apprentissage offrait de meilleures opportunités que la formation à 
temps plein dans ces deux pays, à ma connaissance, aucune n’a porté un regard 
comparatif à ce sujet. 
Ce document de travail évalue donc l’effet de l’apprentissage sur la qualité de la 
transition école-emploi en France et en Allemagne. L’analyse est menée successivement 
sur deux populations distinctes : les sortants du secondaire et du supérieur. En France, cela 
est attendu, puisque l’apprentissage peut être suivi à tous les niveaux de diplôme. En 
Allemagne, le système dual se situe à la fin du collège (Hauptschule, Realschule ou 
Gymnasium). Dans le cas de l’Allemagne, l’étude sur le supérieur porte donc sur une 
population différente et compare la qualité de la transition école-emploi des ex-apprentis 
passés ensuite par le supérieur à celle des autres étudiants du supérieur. L’article s’appuie sur 
les enquêtes Génération pour la France (1998, 2001, 2004 et 2007) et le Socio-Economic 
Panel pour l’Allemagne (vagues 1992-2013). Au-delà de l’aspect comparatif, ces données 
récentes permettent d’actualiser les études réalisées jusque-là sur chaque pays et, pour 
l’Allemagne, d’intégrer l’Allemagne de l’Est dans l’analyse. 
L’analyse de l’apprentissage se fait en deux temps. Un premier temps descriptif met en 
évidence les corrélations existantes entre le fait d’être passé par l’apprentissage et la situation 
sur le marché du travail. Dans une seconde étape, l’effet causal de l’apprentissage est 
étudié : l’analyse descriptive n’est pas causale si la population des apprentis diffère de celle 
des non-apprentis pour des raisons indépendantes au cursus suivi. Ce risque de biais est pris 
en compte ici par la méthode des variables instrumentales. Cette méthode contraint 
l’analyse causale à ne porter que sur une sous-population spécifique. Il s’agit ici des jeunes 
dont le choix de se tourner vers l’apprentissage ou vers les études à temps plein s’est fait en 
relation avec une variable « instrumentale » : pour nous, l’implication de la région d’origine 
dans le développement de l’apprentissage approchée par le taux d’apprentis dans la région 
(voir ci-dessous). 
 
 
En termes descriptifs, les résultats obtenus montrent que l’écart de niveau de chômage des 
jeunes entre la France et l’Allemagne résulte avant tout des vingt-quatre premiers mois 
suivant la sortie d’études. On constate également que l’avantage des apprentis sur les 
étudiants à plein temps est en moyenne plus fort en France pour la plupart des indicateurs 
considérés. Sur les douze premiers mois suivant la sortie du secondaire, il est par exemple 
équivalent à une diminution du chômage de 11,6 points de pourcentage (p.p.) en France 
contre 5,5 p.p. en Allemagne. En sortie d’études supérieures, la réduction du taux de 
chômage est de 8,2 p.p. en France contre 1,7 p.p. en Allemagne. En France, les apprentis font 
également mieux que les étudiants à temps plein sur le moyen terme. Suivre un 
apprentissage est associé à une plus grande probabilité de connaître une période d’emploi 
continu de plus de dix-huit mois lors des trente-six mois suivant la sortie d’études. C’est 
également vrai en sortie de secondaire en Allemagne, même si l’écart entre apprentis et 
étudiants à plein temps est plus faible. Cet effet de moyen terme est doublé d’un temps 
d’attente plus faible avant l’expérience d’une telle période de stabilité. 
La réussite des apprentis dans leur insertion sur le marché du travail relève de 
différents mécanismes suivant le pays. En Allemagne, elle provient surtout d’un taux de 
rétention élevé des entreprises de formation à la fin de l’apprentissage. Par contre, il semble 
que les employeurs ne privilégient pas les jeunes formés en apprentissage lorsqu’ils 
embauchent sur le marché externe. Au contraire, en France, si le taux de rétention des 
entreprises où a lieu la formation est faible, les employeurs semblent privilégier les anciens 
apprentis aux autres étudiants sur le marché externe.  
Ces résultats interrogent la pertinence de travaux institutionnalistes traditionnels pour 
décrire la période actuelle. Tout d’abord, Maurice, Sellier et Silvestre (1979) ont décrit les 
employeurs français comme privilégiant les compétences générales aux compétences 
spécifiques, contrairement aux firmes allemandes. Le contraire apparaîtrait plutôt ici, puisque 
les formations professionnelles à temps plein fournissent plus de compétences générales. 
Ensuite, la littérature des Variétés du Capitalisme (Hall et Soskice, 2001) dépeint 
l’Allemagne comme un pays où une forte coordination entre les acteurs permet à 
l’apprentissage de fournir des compétences pertinentes pour l’ensemble du secteur d’activité. 
Ceci devrait préfigurer d’une situation privilégiée pour les apprentis sur le marché externe, ce 
qui n’est pas le cas dans nos données. En s’appuyant sur les travaux de Busemeyer (2009) et 
Busemeyer et Thelen (2011), que l’on étaye par des statistiques descriptives dans le papier, 
on peut considérer que les mutations récentes du modèle de formation allemand 
fournissent une bonne piste pour expliquer ce résultat. Ces auteurs décrivent une évolution 
depuis un modèle de formation collectif – où les associations d’employeurs contraignent les 
grandes entreprises à former au-delà de leurs besoins pour le bénéfice plus large de 
l’ensemble des entreprises et des PME en particulier – vers un modèle « segmentaire » – où 
les grandes entreprises quittent ces organisations patronales ou négocient des clauses afin 
d’orienter davantage la formation vers leur marché interne et de répondre à leurs besoins de 
compétences spécifiques. 
En termes de qualité de l’emploi obtenu, les résultats montrent que l’apprentissage est 
associé à une probabilité plus forte de travailler à temps plein en sortie de secondaire et 
de supérieur en France et en sortie de secondaire en Allemagne. À genre donné, l’effet en 
sortie de secondaire est similaire dans les deux pays. Enfin, tandis que les ex-apprentis 
français gagnent plus que les étudiants à plein temps en sortie de secondaire et de supérieur à 
la fois sur le court terme et moyen terme (après trois ans), les ex-apprentis sortant du 
supérieur en Allemagne ne gagnent pas plus que les autres étudiants à caractéristiques 
observables données, et ceux sortant de secondaire gagnent moins. Ce dernier résultat est à 
prendre avec précaution étant donné que la majorité de la littérature sur le sujet a trouvé un 
effet opposé. Les données utilisées ici sont cependant plus récentes et couvrent l’Allemagne 
de l’Est. Ce résultat pourrait donc mettre en évidence une tendance au déclin de la place 
relative des apprentis sortant d’école secondaire au sein de la concurrence sur le marché du 
travail allemand. Le nombre croissant d’apprentis passant par le supérieur avant d’arrêter les 
études pourrait fournir un élément d’explication. 
Ces analyses descriptives permettent de caractériser les trajectoires des apprentis par rapport 
aux autres étudiants, mais elles ne mesurent pas l’impact propre de l’apprentissage : d’autres 
facteurs non observables peuvent aussi expliquer les différences de trajectoires. On utilise 
donc la méthode des variables instrumentales pour capter ce risque de biais. L’instrument 
utilisé est le ratio régional du nombre d’apprentis sur le nombre d’étudiants à temps 
plein prévalant au moment du choix de se tourner ou non vers l’apprentissage. 
L’analyse causale apporte trois types de résultats principaux. Premièrement, les analyses 
suggèrent que, lorsque les régions développent l’apprentissage, elles attirent, d’une part, les 
jeunes réussissant moins bien sur le plan académique et peinant à trouver un contrat (cas du 
secondaire ) et, d’autre part, de bons étudiants ne se décidant à suivre une telle filière que si 
un contrat de qualité leur est proposé (cas du supérieur). Les effets sont donc différenciés 
suivant le niveau de sortie d’études. Deuxièmement, pour les sortants du secondaire en 
France, les résultats montrent un avantage comparatif en termes d’employabilité du fait 
de la possible embauche par la firme où a lieu la formation, mais une absence d’effet 
positif en cas de recherche d’emploi sur le marché « externe », suggérant une faible 
qualité de l’apprentissage suivi. Plus généralement, c’est la difficulté de la transition école 
professionnelle à temps plein-emploi et apprentissage-emploi, lorsque le jeune n’est pas 
embauché par son entreprise de formation, qui est mise en évidence ici. En sortie de 
secondaire en Allemagne, l’apprentissage semble augmenter la durée du chômage 
l’année suivant la sortie d’études. De nouveau, ce résultat est contraire à la mince 
littérature traitant de la question. L’instrument diffère cependant et, comme évoqué 
précédemment, les données utilisées ici sont plus récentes et incluent l’Allemagne de l’Est. 
La littérature a montré que les apprentis qui quittent l’école à la fin du secondaire ont suivi 
un apprentissage de moins bonne qualité que la moyenne. Or, ils entrent sur un marché du 
travail où plus de la moitié de la population détient un diplôme en apprentissage. Ceux qui, 
parmi ces jeunes, ne sont pas conservés par leur entreprise de formation se distingueraient 
donc pour les employeurs non par la nature de leur diplôme – comme ce pourrait être le cas 
en France où l’apprentissage est moins développé – mais par la faible qualité de 
l’apprentissage qu’ils ont suivi. Par ailleurs, et contrairement au cas français, le signe positif 
de l’effet mesuré rappelle les bons résultats des étudiants du secondaire dans les écoles 
professionnelles à temps plein. Troisièmement, les régressions mettent en évidence une 
absence d’effet de l’apprentissage sur les trajectoires en sortie de supérieur à la fois en 
France et en Allemagne. Ainsi, l’avantage moyen en sortie d’études à ce niveau s’explique 
avant tout par l’attractivité du système dual en Allemagne et par la sélectivité de 
l’apprentissage dans le supérieur en France. 
Ces résultats apportent des éléments de réflexion en matière de politiques publiques dans 
le cas français. Tout d’abord, les résultats de l’analyse portant sur l’Allemagne montrent 
que, lorsque l’apprentissage gagne en importance dans un pays, il peut atteindre un 
point où ses bénéfices décroissent pour les étudiants dont les résultats au collège sont les 
moins bons. Ensuite, notre étude suggère que l’amélioration de la qualité des études 
professionnelles à temps plein est aussi importante que le développement de l’apprentissage. 
Enfin, dans le secondaire en France, les étudiants attirés par l’apprentissage grâce à 
 
 
l’investissement des régions ne semblent bénéficier de leur formation que lorsqu’ils sont 
embauchés par leur entreprise de formation et non sur le marché externe en raison d’une 
formation de moindre qualité. Ceci souligne qu’un accroissement des subventions destinées à 
favoriser la participation des firmes dans le système peut être d’un effet limité puisqu’elles 
constituent un encouragement à utiliser les apprentis comme travail à bas coût. Conditionner 
les subventions à un taux de rétention moyen de moyen terme et/ou à une certaine 
qualité de formation à ce niveau d’éducation pourrait donc être bienvenu. Notons que ce 
dernier point nécessiterait une surveillance accrue de la part des Chambres de Commerce et 
d’Industrie et des Chambres de Métiers, comme c’est le cas en Allemagne. Concernant 
l’apprentissage dans le supérieur, les résultats encouragent à renverser la tendance initiée 
au début des années 1990 qui a vu se développer l’apprentissage dans les études 
supérieures en France, tandis qu’il perdait en intensité dans le secondaire. En 
particulier, les aides publiques semblent être plus efficaces à ce dernier niveau – 
conditionnellement au fait que le développement de l’apprentissage en résultant n’ait pas lieu 
par des contrats sans perspective d’embauche. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
Unemployment rates of the young people aged 15 to 24 years have remained under 15.6% in 
Germany since its reunification. During this period, it went below this threshold only two 
years in France (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey). The resulting gap averages 11% since 1992. 
Similarly, the activity rate of this age group has barely dropped under 50% in Germany since 
1992 whereas it has not reached 40% in France in the same period. Yet, the gap does not 
stand when one considers the 25-74 year olds. The spread in unemployment rates for this 
population has not exceeded five percentage points and France did better than its neighbour 
between 2001 and 2008. Likewise, the activity rate of the 25-54 year olds has been exceeding 
the German one since 1992. The German labour market clearly stands out to the advantage of 
the youth. The unemployment ratio of the under 25 to the over 25 makes this particularly 
salient: since 1991 it has averaged 1.3 in Germany while it has not been better than 2 in 
France.  
In the public debate, this German success is generally ascribed to the importance of its 
apprenticeship system. About 53% of each age cohort has indeed taken an apprenticeship at 
a point of its schooling (Hippach-Schneider, Krause, and Woll, 2007)2. In 2013 this 
amounted to a stock of about 1,400,000 apprentices in training for a yearly inflow of 
530,700. Apprenticeship – defined here as programs that include both work-based training 
on a firm’s site and in-school education leading to a diploma which curriculum is defined 
according to outlines decided externally to the sole employer – is indeed widely considered 
as providing a comparative advantage for the school-to-work transition. Marsden and Ryan 
(1991), for instance have showed that among the European Economic Community (EEC), 
the group of countries with a higher level of apprenticeship (including Germany) has a 
labour market more favourable to the youth than the rest of the EEC (including France). 
More specifically, Van der Velden and Wolbers (2003) demonstrate that the apprenticeship 
level is one of three factors3 explaining the almost whole variance of youth employment 
between countries.  
Yet, France has been favouring school-based vocational training over apprenticeship. 
Whereas the vocational tracks at the secondary level include a proportion of students similar 
to Germany (respectively 44% and 48% in 2012, Martinot (2015)), only 32% of them follow 
an apprenticeship in France against 70% in Germany (Dayan and Delpech, 2013; Martinot 
2015). Institutionalized in the early post-WWII era in France, this matter of fact has been 
severely questioned since low-skilled unemployment began rising in the 1970s. Since then, 
political actors have been holding a strong discourse in favour of an increase in the 
proportion of apprentices (Dayan and Delpech, 2013). Yet, despite a clear evolution between 
1993 and 19984, the undertaken reforms have had little effect. As of 2013, the stock of 
1 I thank P. Askenazy, C. Erhel, C. Perraudin and S. Briole for advice and suggestion. The first analyses on this paper 
have been led at the CEET in the context of a research internship. 
2 Importantly enough, the gap in unemployment and activity rates of the 15-24 holds when removing from the analysis 
the apprentices – considered as employed. 
3 Alongside the employment protection level and the general situation of the labour force in the country 
4 Stemming from the “loi quinquennale pour l’emploi” 
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apprentices reached 424,000 for a yearly inflow of 273,000 (Depp, 2013; Dares, 2015)5. As a 
result, the discourse has slowly evolved from a call to increase numbers per the German 
example to a drive to copy the organisation of the German apprenticeship model. This has 
been relying on an implicit that apprenticeship in Germany does better, not solely regarding 
its ability to involve a large number of firms and young people, but also in ensuring 
apprentices a good school-to-work transition.  
Yet, to my knowledge, no comparative study has ever been made on the efficiency of the 
German and the French apprenticeship systems. This paper therefore follows both the aim of 
a comparative study and of a within country work with up-to-date datasets. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 provide some elements of 
background on the organisation of apprenticeship in both countries, on the strategy of the 
training firms and on the institutional factors at stake in the relation between vocational 
training and education (VET hereafter) and the labour market. I present the data in Section 2 
and show some descriptive statistics in Section 3. Section 4 describes the model and 
discusses the validity of the instrument used. I discuss the results and conclude in the last two 
Sections. 
In brief, I separately lead the estimations on those exiting school after secondary education 
and higher education in each country. For France, this is straight-forward since 
apprenticeship is available at mostly all levels. For Germany, the treated group in higher 
education is composed of students who followed a higher education track after completing an 
apprenticeship in the secondary education. The instrument used in the IV setting is the ratio 
of apprentices over full-time students in studies at the corresponding level the year before the 
individual choice is to be made. The descriptive statistics emphasize that the overall 
difference in youth unemployment between the two countries is mostly driven by the 24 first 
post-exit months. I then show that apprenticeship training benefit more women than men on 
average. More generally, apprenticeship training is broadly associated with stronger positive 
outcomes in France than in Germany for students exiting both secondary and higher 
education. To a certain extent, this advantage follows a divergent pattern in France and 
Germany. In Germany, it mostly stems from a high retention rate from the training firms’ 
part whereas, in France, the advantage of apprentices is also rooted in their position on the 
firms’ external labour market. These results allow me to discuss the literature of the Aix 
School and of the Varieties of Capitalism. As for the causal study, I firstly discuss the nature 
of the compliers in each cell. I then evidence that compliers have negative employment 
prospects in Germany due to the low quality of their apprenticeship training, the large 
number of ex-apprentices on the labour market and the rather good outcomes of the full-time 
vocational students. In France, apprenticeship training has a positive effect on compliers’ 
employability. This is only channelled by their likelihood to be retained in the training firm 
after their apprenticeship. The absence of causal effect on wages coupled with the fact that 
retention rates are low in France highlight the poor outcomes of the compliers when they 
follow full-time vocational training and when they are not hired by their training firm in the 
case of an apprenticeship. Finally, the IV led on the higher education cell of each country 
show that the average apprentices’ advantage is rooted in the high quality of the students 
rather than in the very apprenticeship track. 
 
  
5 Demographics and the length of the apprenticeship tracks (mostly two or three years in both countries) do not explain 
much of the variation in numbers between the two countries.  
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1. BACKGROUND 
1.1 Apprenticeship tracks stand at a different position in the French and 
the German educational systems 
In Germany, the apprenticeship system (duale ausbildung or dual system) can be reached 
after the three tracks of lower secondary education – Hauptschule, Realschule and 
Gymnasium. Yet, they offer different chances of success. The strong link between the 
previous school results and the choice of lower secondary education results in a disadvantage 
for students exiting the Hautpschule. In a context of diploma inflation (see Table 1 in 
Appendix), firms are increasingly preferring pupils owing a diploma from the Realschule 
(Protsch and Dieckhoff, 2011). Nowadays, 40% of the former finds an apprenticeship against 
60% of the latter, despite both tracks firstly targeting the dual system. Inequality in access 
among students stretches out to the quality of apprenticeship when accepted in the program. 
Students exiting the Hauptschule are more often accepted in 2-year long contracts in the craft 
industry. Those with a diploma from the Realschule or the Gymnasium are more likely to 
find a 3-year or 3.5-year long contract in large industrial firms (Granato and Kroll, 2013). 
Importantly enough, the dual system is not a dead-end in terms of education since it is a 
gateway towards higher education. On-the-job training also provides good opportunities for 
postapprentices, especially through the Maister qualification which is needed to train 
apprentices (see Appendix 1). As a result, according to Möbus and Sevestre (1991, 88), “one 
should not view the dual system as a standardized training. The only common feature of all 
apprenticeships is the diploma and the national educational outlines”. 
There is an even stronger hierarchy among apprentices in France since most diplomas can be 
reached through both an apprenticeship and a full-time track. In particular, the baccalauréat 
divides two rather different populations among apprentices. Apprentices from secondary 
education are more often members of disadvantaged social classes and are more likely to 
have faced difficulties at school than the rest of their cohort. Conversely, apprentices in 
higher education are close to higher education full-time students in terms of both their family 
backgrounds and their school results (Moreau, 2008). The training firms also differ between 
the two groups: more craftwork for the secondary education apprentices, larger industrial 
firms for those in higher education (Fougère and Schwerdt, 2001). There is a “‘glass ceiling’ 
at the baccalauréat level” (Moreau, 2008, 126): only 28% of the apprentices in secondary 
education go on in the higher education; conversely, only 12% of the apprentices in higher 
education have followed an apprenticeship in secondary education (Moreau, 2003). 
Importantly enough, apprenticeship does not have the same function on either side of the 
baccalauréat. While it lasts for at least two years in secondary education, 35% of 
apprenticeships in higher education lasts less than a year, thereby being more of a “super 
internship”  than anything else (Martinot, 2015: 21). Triggered with the ‘Séguin’ (1987) and 
‘Cresson’ (1992) laws which enacted higher education apprenticeships, the heterogeneity of 
apprentices has been accelerating since then. The nearly whole increase in the number of 
apprentices since 1996 has happened in higher education which now accounts for 30% of the 
total (see Appendix 1). 
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1.2 The apprentices’ advantage explained through firms’ strategies 
The smoother school-to-work transition of apprentices compared with students from full-time 
vocational education has been largely documented in the literature. As for France, Sollogoub 
and Ulrich (1999) and Simonnet and Ulrich (2000) use the several-step method from 
Barnow, Cain and Goldberger (1980) to clear the selection bias into apprenticeship. They 
show that among students leaving school at the end of secondary education, apprentices are 
advantaged in terms of rapidity of access to the first job and of employment duration during 
the first four years following the school exit. This latter effect decreases with the diploma 
level (Simonnet and Ulrich 2000; Arrighi and Brochier 2005). Using a bivariate probit, 
Issehnane (2011) also finds that apprentices are advantaged in terms of probability of 
employment one year after the school exit6. Regarding the post-studies earnings, the two 
groups receive an equivalent wage right after the school exit (Issehnane, 2011; Simonnet and 
Ulrich, 2000). Yet, the result is less clear-cut on the longer run. Sollogoub and Ulrich’s study 
(1999) grants students leaving full-time secondary vocational training a small surplus 4 years 
after the school exit whereas Abriac et al. (2009) found an opposite result three years after 
the school exit (bivariate probit). As for higher education, Isshenane (2011) finds an 
advantage for apprentices in terms of wage but no significant difference in employment 
probability when correcting for the selection bias. 
On the German side, most of the previous literature has shown that apprentices enjoy a 
stronger probability of employment after leaving education both on average (Franz et al., 
2000; Winkelmann, 1996; Parey, 2012) and after taking into account the selection bias 
(Parey 2012). Interestingly the latter has a negative sign in Parey’s study on Western German 
men. This suggests that those whose decision to enter apprenticeship is related to an increase 
in the vacancy rate of training spots (his instrument) have unobservable characteristics 
negatively valued on the labour market. Contrarily to these results, Riphahn and Zibrowius 
(2015) find no difference between the two groups. As for wages, apprentices are generally 
found to earn amounts similar to full time vocational students (Winkelmann, 1994; Witte and 
Kalleberg, 1995). Parey finds a positive effect on average but none in his IV analysis. 
Finally, unemployed full time students find a job quicker than apprentices in unemployment 
(Winkelmann, 1996) which suggests that apprentices’ early advantage is much conditional on 
employment in the training firm. Importantly, most of these studies have worked on Western 
Germany before 2000. Only Riphahn and Zibrowius (2015) work on a more recent period on 
the whole youth population. They mostly use the margin vocational training v.s. non 
vocational education. Yet, interestingly, they only find minor differences in outcomes 
between women and men or West Germany and East Germany. 
 
These studies draw an advantage for apprentices over full-time vocational education students. 
Yet, they do not provide a comparative look and are not sufficient to state which of the 
French or the German system provides the best relative outcome to the apprentices, although 
this is a prerequisite for any institutional transfer. Moreover, for the German side, an analysis 
on a more recent period is necessary due to the numerous changes the German labour market 
has experienced. Before quantitatively tackling the issue, I consider the theoretical rationales 
for the apprenticeship advantage. 
6 These two methods are discussed in Section 4 and Appendix 4. 
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Apprentices’ advantages over full time students firstly stem from an educational ground. The 
literature in education research has argued that apprenticeship increases the motivation of 
those less inclined towards academically oriented tracks by making concrete the theory learnt 
at school (Unwin and Wellington, 1995; Lerman and Pouncy, 1990). Being surrounded by 
expert workers would also extract one from the peer pressure opposing hard work which can 
occur in some deprived neighbourhoods (Lerman and Pouncy, 1990). On the cognitive side, 
the combination of theoretical and applied learning may generate positive spillovers on each 
other (Parey, 2012). Through work experience, apprenticeship may finally provide a young 
person work-related skills such as self-discipline or team-work abilities, thereby easing the 
often sharp transition between full time studies and work (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Parey, 2012).  
The relative position of apprentices also stems from the training firms’ strategy. The 
literature generally retains two ideal-typical strategies for taking on an apprentice. The first 
one is cost-based and turned towards present benefits. In this case, the “training” firm ensures 
that the apprentice is contributing more to its output than she is costing through her wage, the 
training facilities and the non-productive time of the “maister”7. This “current production” 
strategy (Lindley, 1975) is mostly taking place when a firm substitutes the apprentice for 
regular workers to take advantage of the cheap labour costs of the former. West Germany for 
instance was plagued with this type of firms’ behaviour before the 1969 vocational law 
(Taylor, 1981). The “current production” strategy can also be attractive in the case of a 
shortage of unskilled labour or against an unstable business cycle since apprentices constitute 
a flexible workforce with low firing costs (Wolter and Ryan, 2011). When “trained” with 
such a strategy, an apprentice is therefore expected to be in a worse position than the rest of 
her cohort as she is unlikely to receive a job offer by the training firm and a priori has little 
credentials to sell on the market. 
The second strategy is to invest in human capital with future expected profits. In this future 
production strategy, the firm is looking for a new skilled employee and provides the 
apprentice an actual training likely to generate positive net training costs. An apprentice 
trained with such a strategy will therefore be likely to enjoy a good position on the labour 
market, due to both the high probability of being hired by the training firm and the skills she 
can value on the external market. One can state several reasons why an employer would 
invest in apprenticeship training rather than hiring an external jobseeker (and, in particular, 
one from a full time vocational school). First, such an investment is especially likely to 
happen when firms face (or expect) a shortage of the external supply of skilled labour 
(Fougère and Schwerdt, 2002) Second, apprenticeship provides employers with a good 
screening device: it is a cheap fixed-term contract with no firing costs at its end. It therefore 
allows hiring workers who have already proven themselves to the contrary of external 
jobseekers, thereby decreasing the costs rising from adverse selection. Third, employers’ 
associations have a role to play on the design of both the school-based and the in-house parts 
of the apprenticeship curricula. On the one hand, this decreases the asymmetry of 
information over the trainees’ abilities and, on the other hand, it is likely to better shape the 
curriculum towards the actual production needs in comparison with the curricula in full time 
education. This latter point is reinforced by the fact that firms are more likely to share private 
information such as their skills requirements to business associations than to the public actors 
in charge of designing courses for full-time vocational education (Culpepper, 2003; Wolter 
7 N.B. such profits during the training period are impossible in a competitive set up with “free entry at the start of [the] 
period” (Leuven, 2005:89) since firms enter the market until the surplus drops to zero (Ryan and Wolter, 2011:537). The 
actual happening of negative net training costs highlights the existence of monopsony power, see Appendix A.2. 
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and Ryan, 2011). Four, even though regulatory rules on apprenticeship limit employers’ 
discretionary power regarding the on-site training, there is still some room to partially adapt 
it to the firm-specific tasks the future employee will be required to lead (Barone and van de 
Werfhorst 2011)8. Last, apprenticeship can create some asymmetry of information between 
firms thereby generating incentives to train – especially in a context of wage compression – 
(see Appendix A.2). 
 
It therefore seems that one should compare the relative importance of each of the two 
strategies in France and Germany to postulate in which of the two countries apprentices 
enjoy the best situation relatively to full-time students. This boils down to studying the sign 
of the net training costs in each country: the literature generally considers that the larger they 
are, the more likely a firm would be to provide a good training. I show here why this 
reasoning could be misleading and is anyway difficult to apply here. Net training costs are 
roughly equal to the cost of training facilities + the maister’s training time + the apprentice’s 
wage – the apprentice’s output – the public subsidies received. The two former cannot be 
used here as they are not evaluated in France (Martinot 2015, 71). Regarding the wage, it 
seems that no comparative hypothesis can be sketched due to the large and overcrossing 
range of apprentice’s earnings in the two countries. Apprentices’ wage depends on the school 
year and the age in both countries. In France, it varies between 25% and 78% of the national 
minimum wage (i.e. between 366€ and 1,144€) or of the sectoral minimum wage if higher. In 
Germany, apprentices do not benefit from the national minimum wage. Their wage is 
sectoral and varies between lander, thereby resulting in an even larger spread (for instance, 
214€ for a hair-dresser to be in Eastern Germany, 1,374€ for an apprentice working with 
reinforced concrete in Western Germany). The difference in apprentice’s output does not 
provide better room for any hypothesis. Fougère and Schwerdt (2002) indeed show that the 
net effect of apprentices on the expected output for training firms is similar in both countries: 
positive in medium firms (between 20 and 200 employees) and negative in the others. 
Finally, public subsidies are much higher in France than in Germany. Martinot (2015, 71) 
quantify them to 5,644€ per apprentice in the former and 455 € in the latter. Accordingly, the 
costs for the training facilities and the maister’s time aside, net training costs seems to be 
lower in France due to more generous public subsidies.  
One would therefore expect current production strategies to be more widespread in France. 
Yet, Fougère and Schwerdt (2002, 13) show that firms train apprentices in relation to their 
need in skilled workers in both countries – and, in medium firms, despite the involvement of 
apprentices in the production (Fougère and Schwerdt 2002, 14-16). They also fail to evidence 
a strategy of substitution between apprentices and unskilled workers in France or in 
Germany. A more recent literature has led more precise case studies and showed that some 
sectors do have a strategy of substitution in Germany (see for instance Mohrenweiser and 
Zwick, 2009; Dionisius et al., 2009)9. Yet, I could not find such results for the French case 
and am therefore limited to using the older comparative study from Fougère and Schwerdt. 
8 Importantly enough, in his 1994 article on the German apprenticeship, Soskice leads a back of the envelop calculation 
suggesting that the on-the-job training costs necessary to adapt an externally hired worker to the tasks ascribed to her is 
“of the same order of magnitude as the net costs of an apprenticeship” (Soskice, 1994:37). This calculation questions the 
two latter arguments on the demand-side based advantages of apprentices. 
9 Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) work on contemporary gross profits and find that “in trade, commercial, craft and 
construction occupations […] apprentices are substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers […] the apprenticeship 
training rather is a human capital investment [in manufacturing industries]”. Dionisius and coauthors (2009:Table 2) 
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Two conclusions should therefore be drawn here. First, it has not been proved that French 
firms follow a current production strategy more often than their German counterparts, despite 
(a priori) cheaper training costs10. Second, it seems necessary to mitigate the reality of the 
two ideal-typical strategies. Fougère and Schwerdt’s result suggests that a current production 
strategy is not necessarily antagonist to a proper training since medium companies do have a 
wish to retain post-apprentices despite their use in current production. Similarly, a 
comparative study on Germany and Switzerland (Dionisius et al., 2009) urges to discuss the 
relevance of the two ideal-typical strategies. The authors show that despite average negative 
net training costs (i.e. positive profits), 3-year long apprenticeship in Switzerland provides at 
least as good a training as in Germany where net costs are positive for 93% of the firms. The 
most important reason behind this is that unions and works councils constrain firms not to 
use apprentices for productive tasks in Germany. Thus, during on-site training, German 
apprentices do more practice and benefit from more instruction time thereby learning less 
through productive tasks (Dionisius et al., 2009; Ryan et al., 2013). Retention rates at the end 
of apprenticeship training are larger in Germany than in Switzerland since German firms 
need to ensure profits to cover their initial investment. Yet non-retained apprentices are likely 
to find a job quicker in Switzerland if we only consider the productivity ability. Hence, a 
seemingly current production strategy can lead to decent outcomes for apprentices on the 
labour market. In other words, a firm could substitute apprentices for workers while training 
them at the same time.  
As a result, if one considers that the most important feature of youth unemployment relies in 
the very content of the training and the risk of mismatch with the demand, then approaching 
the question through training costs may not be the best way to deal with it. Conversely, if one 
considers that the major struggle for a first-time labour seeker is rooted in the difficulty to 
sell her credentials on the labour market for other reasons – for instance a firms’ lack of trust 
in the educational system – then working on firms’ training costs may be a good option since 
firms enduring net positive training costs will be willing to hire their ex-apprentices to ensure 
future sur-profits. In this regard, public subsidies could be harmful by their incentivizing 
effect for current production strategies.  
1.3. Institutionalists’ views on the French and German vocational training 
systems and the subsequent hypotheses stemming from these 
I turn here to an institutional view of the role of apprenticeship training in France and 
Germany and show that the `societal coherence’ in each of the two countries provides 
interesting avenues of hypothesis. The previous part aimed at drawing hypothesis based on 
the expected strategies that similar rational driven agents would lead in the divergent 
environments of France and Germany. Typically, if training costs are lower, one would 
expect a stronger use of a current production strategy whichever the society; or other things 
equal, larger information asymmetries should lead to more training. The Aix-school of 
thoughts (see the seminal works of Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1979, 1986) has criticized 
this method. In their words, “the universalism of these approaches assumes invariant across 
found a net training cost 7,528 € per year (€ of 2000) in Germany and state that 93% of German firms bear a positive net 
cost. 
10 Note that in a first version of their paper, Fougère and Schwerdt (2001) had even found the reverse: “the small and 
medium firms [taken as a group], use apprenticeship to invest in human capital more often in France than in Germany” 
(Fougère and Schwerdt, 2001:691). 
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societies two elements of the basic model: the social nature of the actors […] and the 
rationality directing these actors’ actions. The strategies implemented and the constraints 
which constitute the environment solely vary” (Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre, 1979: 333). 
Conversely, the authors regard social phenomena as coherently interacting and thereby 
explain differences in outcomes. As for vocational education, this leads Möbus and Verdier 
(2000, 272) to state: “the vocational diploma, as a result from social bargaining and as a basis 
of a labour market regulation, is of an extremely different nature on each side of the Rhine: 
fundamentally an organizing rule of the labour market in Germany (Reynaud, 1987), a mere 
signal to value on this market in France (Gamel, 2000)”. The difference in outcomes would 
stem from this difference in nature. 
According to Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre (1979) (MSS hereafter), one can draw two ideal-
types for the conception of a firm’s working system. Either it chooses its own criteria to 
define the work stations and it expects the workers to adapt to them (“the organisation 
dominates qualifications”), or it firstly takes into account the workers’ qualification to 
delineate the job tasks according to them (“qualifications dominate the organisation”). The 
authors state that the first case is more likely to occur when professional training is relatively 
rare and not thorough. They regard France as close to it. In this ideal-type, jobseekers’ 
adaptability is their most valued skill and is assumed to be best proxied by their level of 
diploma. Jobseekers are therefore ranked according to their highest level of diploma from the 
general education and, as a result, the jobs requiring only a short on-the-job training end up 
undervalued in comparison with managing or designing tasks. This reinforces the social 
appeal for long and general education against vocational training. Since firms do not 
recognize school diploma as qualifications leading to professional jobs but decide of their 
own organisation, skills are rather firm-specific and are slowly acquired within the company 
(Eyraud, Marsden, and Silvestre, 1990). MSS name these setups “Internal Labour Markets” 
(ILM) and see France as a good example. 
The spine of the second ideal-type – to which MSS associate Western Germany – is 
vocational education and training. It is more likely to develop where “the generalisation of 
vocational education and its social legitimation urge the firm to define work organisation in 
function of the professional norms stemming from it, and that the company legitimizes in its 
turn” (Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre, 1979: 347). Here, firms enjoy a strong traditional role 
in the design and organization of the VET. As a result (or as a “compensation” in MSS’ 
words), they acknowledge the referential stemming from the educative system. MSS name 
this case an “Occupational Labour Market” (OLM). Importantly enough, as for the ILM, the 
several characteristics of the OLM are self-reinforcing.  
This framework provides several conclusions. First, as an example of OLM, Germany 
displays a coherent linkage between the initial and further vocational education systems. 
Once acquired the diploma from apprenticeship or full time vocational education, a student 
hired in a company is later able to gain more qualifications specific to his branch of trade, 
transferable to the whole sector and necessary to reach a better position in her stream. This is 
in particular the case of the diploma of Maister which gives the right to supervise an 
apprentice. The German societal convention of professional training therefore generates 
cores of professional identity within in each branch (Silvestre 1990). Vocational training, and 
specifically apprenticeship, is therefore attractive. Such a professional identity per sector 
does not exist in France and VET is depreciated. In particular, French vocational diplomas 
are targeted towards the continuity of initial education tracks rather than aiming at a direct 
entrance on the labour market (Möbus and Verdier, 2000). Thus, exiting school after a 
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vocational diploma of the secondary education offers better outcomes on the German labour 
market than in France (Möbus and Sevestre, 1991, 77) (see Section 2).  
 
Conclusions regarding the relative advantage of apprentices over full time students are less 
straight-forward. First, in Germany, the inherited role of firms in the design of apprenticeship 
training has gained a social legitimation through its founding role in the societal coherence of 
the industrial system (see for instance MSS 1979, 346 and Appendix A.3). Conversely, the 
inherited role of the French State over VET (see Appendix A.3) has gained some force 
through both the increasing integration of vocational training in the general educative system 
and the stronger autonomy of French firms to design and organise work stations. The positive 
outcomes ascribed to the firms’ and business associations’ role in the design of 
apprenticeship should therefore be larger in Germany. Second, on the first hand, the German 
OLM better values specific skills than general training and apprenticeship is the school track 
where qualifications delivered are the most specific (Brauns et al., 1997). Conversely to the 
French ILM, apprentices should therefore be preferred to full time vocational students on the 
external market. Yet, on the second hand, apprentices are part of the training firm’s internal 
labour markets. As such, they gain knowledge of the specific organisation designed by the 
firm and the specific set of skills relevant to it. According to the previous discussion, this 
should be more valued in France. Everything else equal, it should offer a stronger relative 
advantage to the French apprentices11.  This latter hypothesis gains in power by considering 
the fact that French firms have more discretionary power on the contents of on-site training 
than their German counterparts. 
 
The theories of the Aix School of Thoughts are mostly framed in terms of ‘socialisation of 
the agents’ and mostly pertain to a path dependency explanation. Outcomes are rooted in the 
fact that social actors act according to integrated norms on the industrial sphere and in 
function of the pre-existing recognition of professional training in their own society (this is 
particularly salient in MSS, 1979; see also MSS, 1982:313-314). Instead, the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001) is framed in a framework of game theory. It 
reintroduces rational and investment-thinking actors12 in the analysis. In their words, 
“workers face the problem of deciding how much to invest in what skills, […] firms face the 
problem of securing a workforce with suitable skills” (ibid, 7). The determinant of an 
educative system relies in the “strategic interactions central to the behaviour of economic 
actors” (ibid, 5). Hall and Soskice root these in 5 interacting spheres: industrial relations 
institutions, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and 
the internal structure of the firms.  
In Germany, access to finance does not traditionally rely on balance-sheet criteria or current 
benefits. Instead, investors have access to private information through cross-shareholding 
(supplier and customer firms are often seating in the supervisory boards), joint-membership 
11 The retention rate of apprentices is lower in France than in Germany. After graduating from a CAP, BEP, Bac pro or 
BP, 42% of the French apprentices stay in their training firm. The figure is of 44% after graduating from a BTS, DUT, 
université, or grande école (author’s calculation using the Céreq’s representative sample of apprentices leaving school in 
2004). In Germany, in 2000, more than 50% of those graduating from the dual system go on working for their training 
firm (respectively 60% and 46% in Western and Eastern Germany) (Berufsbildungsbericht, 2002 : 462). This difference 
does not go against the above-mentioned hypothesis since full-time vocational students also have better outcomes on the 
German Labour market than in France.  
12 They do refer to informal rules (Hall and Soskice, 2001:13) but this is secondary in their analysis. 
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in business associations and joint-research. Here, reputation expectedly plays an important 
role since exchanges in this sphere consist in a repeated game – notably channelled through 
business associations which thereby are able to monitor and sanction firms if they hide 
information. Hence the efficiency of business associations in understanding sectoral needs in 
skills – important for apprenticeship courses to be well designed (see above) – and their 
ability to pressurize members to take on apprentices. The long-run expectations of the 
financial system allows firm to offer their employees long-term contracts not likely to be 
broken in time of recession. Works councils also play a major role in this regard. As 
members of the supervisory boards, they have some power over lay-offs and working 
conditions. The resulting little flexibility over the workforce urges workers to invest in firm-
specific skills and therefore to engage in an apprenticeship. Finally, business associations 
ensure that poaching happens as little as possible thanks to industrial-level wage bargaining.  
These main lines of coordination in Germany explain the development of apprenticeship in 
the country in a different way than MSS. More importantly for our case, on the first hand 
apprenticeship is likely to be efficient since long-job tenure and the lemon-market resulting 
from the no poaching condition (see Appendix A.2) are incentives for firms to invest in 
training with a future production view. On the second hand, the German ‘Coordinated 
Market Economy’ largely relies on “employer associations [which] are encompassing 
organizations that provide many benefits to their members and to which most firms in a 
sector belong” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 25–26). Yet, we know that business associations’ 
membership has strongly declined since the 1980s. According to Streeck (2010, Table 3.1), 
the membership density of the employers’ association of the metal industry (Gesamtmetall) 
declined from 54.6% in 1985 to 22.5% in 2003 (last year available, 25.5% in the West, 7.6% 
in the East). Moreover, the benefits provided by business associations should be taken into 
consideration when assessing the net training costs. Indeed, while rules on training may 
require a training firm to bear a positive net training cost, the loss it would endure if non-
training meant leaving the sectoral business association could be higher, thereby urging a 
rational-counting firm to take on apprentices. In other words, some firms could train 
apprentices up to the requirements of a business association in order to keep on benefiting 
from the association’s membership. In that case, positive net training costs would be 
compatible with a current production strategy. Next, the sanctioning power of business 
association should be put into question. Firms voluntarily enter these associations and 
exclusion may lead to a rise in poaching undesired by business associations (Culpepper, 
2001: 292). This is especially true in Eastern Germany where apprenticeship has developed 
from the 1990s onwards and in a context of decreasing business associations’ memberships: 
“[t]hese associations, concerned with the stagnation of membership numbers in eastern 
Germany, admit that they have no credible sanctioning mechanism against free-riding 
companies [on bargaining wage rates], and the companies know it” (ibid:293).  
The case of Eastern Germany largely falls out of Hall and Soskice’s analysis. The strong 
development of the market in a state-organized economy with bankrupted large state-owned 
firms resulted in an increasing heterogeneity among Eastern German firms, thereby limiting 
their capacity to organize despite the historical footprint of apprenticeship (Piotti, 2011: 400). 
Western German firms have largely taken over these big firms and stretched out Western 
business associations ties to the Easter part (Culpepper, 2001). Yet, small and medium firms 
were largely left aside in this process and collective agreements have been covering 
respectively about 10 and 20 percentage points less Eastern employees and employers in 
comparison with their Western German counterparts (Marius R. Busemeyer and Thelen, 
2015; Culpepper, 2001). The results established by the VoC literature therefore mostly stand 
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for Western Germany and one should be cautious regarding the Eastern part. The lesser level 
of coordination drives the hypothesis of a lesser efficiency of apprenticeship in this part of 
Germany.  
France is an outlier in the VoC literature: it fits neither in the German like category of the 
Coordinated Market Economies nor in the Anglo-Saxon like one of the Liberal Market 
Economies. Instead, some have defined it as a Mixed-Market Economy (or State-Led 
Economy). The State has traditionally had a predominant role in organising the economy 
both directly through legislation and public-owned firms and indirectly through the elite civil 
servants taking position in major private firms (Thatcher, 2007: 155). The country indeed 
displays a “mode of coordination […] [which]entails a system whereby the state, banks and 
large firms are intertwined through a complex elite network” (Hancké, 2001: 313): the 
organising role of both elected and unelected civil servants has not favoured the development 
of stakeholders’ organisations in the country (Hancké, 2001; Culpepper, 2001; Goyer, 2007). 
Thus, despite important cross-shareholding across large firms, business associations are 
weak. They lack “the capacities of information circulation and deliberation” (Culpepper, 
2001: 298) and are generally seen as some State’s co-opted bodies (ibid). Moreover, there are 
little cooperative links between suppliers and large firms: until recently, the former “had 
traditionally been treated as simple executors from large firm orders” (Hancké, 2001: 319). 
As of VET, the lack of coordination between private actors increases poaching risks. It also 
limits the sector-specific skills to the profit of firm-specific ones. The State has tried to take 
over but with no private actors with whom to coordinate its action and from whom it would 
obtain necessary information such as sectoral needs in skills, it largely failed to foster 
apprenticeship (Culpepper, 2001). As for internal industrial relations, the coordinating role of 
the elite results in the concentration of power in the CEO and in top managers within firms. 
Conversely, employees have little power to block managerial decisions. In particular, “firm-
level works councils possess limited information rights on the hiring of new staff ‒ not a full 
veto power that could prevent employers from replacing current workers with new 
employees” (Goyer, 2007: 210). The lack of coordination at the firm-level therefore results in 
little incentive to invest in apprenticeships for students: they have less guarantees to keep 
their job in case of firm reorganization than their German counterparts and have less skills to 
sell on the external market since the low level of sectoral coordination leaves firms enough 
room to mostly provide firm-specific skills.  
As a result, here again, two competitive forces seems to play. On the first hand, the skills 
provided in the school part should be less properly targeted at current industrial needs due to 
the lack of private actors’ coordination. Moreover, the lack of portability of the skills 
provided during the in-house training part should depreciate apprentices’ outcomes on the 
external market. Yet, on the second hand, the firm-specificity of these skills may be much 
valued by the training firm in its hiring process. The lack of coordination would result in a 
low number of apprenticeship contracts but good outcomes for the young people taken on. 
2. DATA 
2.1 The surveys 
For the French case, I use the Céreq’s surveys “Génération”. They provide a representative 
sample of the students – including apprentices – leaving education for the first time for at 
least a year. Produced every three years since 1998, the surveys are labeled after the exit year 
(“Génération 1998” for instance). Each respondent is surveyed 3 years after her school exit 
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and again 2 years, 5 years and 7 years latter for the 1998 and 2004 generations. I focus on the 
early school-work transition and therefore use the 3-year post-exit surveys of the 1998, 2001, 
2004 and 2007 generations.  
As for Germany, I use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). This is a general survey, 
representative of the German population at the household and the individual levels (Haisken-
DeNew and Frick, 2005). I only use the answers from students leaving school between 1992 
and 2013 as some of the key variables I use are absent or are differently worded before 1992 
and because I need to know the outcomes of the post-exit years to carry my analysis (hence 
preventing the use of later waves). 
2.2 The last observable school-to work transition and the construction of 
key variables 
To have some comparative value, the French and German analyses should be carried out on 
similar underlying populations. Yet, it is not straight forward to identify the first school exit 
in the German panel due to the attrition and the age of entrance in the panel: the first school-
to-work transition observed is not necessarily the first one. This is reinforced by the fact that 
school breaks are common in Germany. There is therefore a strong risk to mistake school 
resumptions for first exits. Importantly enough, one can show that the probability to be in 
employment the years following the first school exit significantly differ from subsequent 
ones. I therefore work on the last observable school-to-work transition in this paper for both 
countries13. The selection over the SOEP sample boils down to retaining a sample of 
3,489 individuals. As for France, I use 99,861 observations spread between the five surveys 
(respectively 40,648, 11,320, 27,707 and 20,186 for the 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 cohorts). 
I first study short run outcomes by focusing on the first 12 months following the school exit. 
I use three criteria of analysis: the number of months in unemployment among these first 
12 post-exit months, the proportion of months spent in full time employment with respect to 
the total number of months spent in employment and the first wage declared. I then turn to 
the 3-year post-exit range to work on the medium run employment situation. Here, I first 
follow Lopez (2004) and study the probability to experience more than 18 months in 
employment (either full time or part time) with no break. Among those who experience such 
an employment spell, I study the number of months spent before the beginning of the period 
as well as the first wage declared after the 18th month of the period.  
I have to mention three points here. First, Respondents to the SOEP only declare a yearly 
wage. I therefore use for the short-run analysis the wage stated the year of the school exit if 
available, and the one of the post-exit year if not14. Regarding the middle-run analysis, I use 
the first wage and contract type declared after the 18th month of the period. In both cases I 
control for the time between the school exit and the relevant interview. In the French case, 
short run wage levels are those of the longest work spell of the post-exit year and middle-run 
wages are those declared at the end of the first job ending after the 18th month of the period 
or in the last observed month if no job ending is observed. Here also, I control for the time 
spent since the school exit. The number of months in part-time employment and in 
13 I do not take into consideration transitions from further education towards employment since these are occurring in the 
course of a job. Likewise, training delivered by the public employment service (Pôle emploi and the Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit) are not taken into consideration here.  
14 Winkelmann (1996) states that the inaccuracy stemming from the fact that wages are declared once a year rather than 
monthly only marginally affects his results. 
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unemployment is based on calendar spelled variables for both countries. In the SOEP, each 
month, surveyed people have to choose between full-time employment, part-time 
employment, first-time company training/apprenticeship, further training, unemployment, 
retirement, parental leave, studies, military service, housework and other15. As for France, 
respondents can choose between: temporary work, self-employed, housework, employed, 
holidays, job search, inactivity, training, school resumption, military or civil service. When 
employed, respondents can then state if this is a full-time or a part-time job.  
Second, I separately lead the estimations on secondary education exits and higher education 
exits in each country. I aim at comparing the outcomes of apprentices and full-time students 
at a given diploma level. For France, this is straight-forward since apprenticeship is available 
at mostly all levels. For Germany, the treated group in higher education is composed of 
students who followed a higher education track after completing an apprenticeship in the 
secondary education. 
Third, the apprenticeship dummy is 0 if an apprentice fails her exams or breaks her contract 
before its end16. If it is harder to obtain an apprenticeship diploma in comparison with a full-
time diploma in Germany than it is in France, I am likely to overestimate the German relative 
advantage of apprentices over full-time students; especially if this leads to some auto-selection 
anterior to the choice of a vocational track. Yet, I have no possibility to avoid this pitfall here if 
I want to obtain the differentiated value of vocational diplomas on the labour market.  
3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Unemployment and NEET rates 
Figures 3 to 10 display the unemployment rate and the rate of youth neither in employment, 
nor in education and training (NEET). Both are the average ratio of unemployed or NEET 
months over the first (“t+1” hereafter), second (“t+2”) and third (“t+3”) years following the 
school exit. Graphs are separately drawn for students exiting secondary or higher education. 
In the German case, the mean over all cohorts is used due to the small size of the dataset. As 
for France, each cohort is separately displayed. Importantly, the unemployment cell in 
Germany is built on declarations of being registered as unemployed whereas in France, it is 
based on declarations of job-search. The inaccuracy in definition disappears with the analysis 
of NEET rates. 
At first sight, it first appears that exiting higher education provides much better outcomes. 
Second, the overall difference in youth unemployment between the two countries is mostly 
driven by the 24 first post-exit months. If one calculates similar unemployment and NEET 
rates over the whole 36 first post-exit months, the group-to-group difference in 
unemployment and in the NEET rates are of less than 6.5ppt in either the “secondary” group 
or the “higher education” one17. Third, if one compares the average cohort outcomes for 
France and Germany over the period, it appears that the French apprentices and full-time 
15 I also use partly use these variables to identify school exits. As Winkelmann (1996), I rely on the question ”Did you 
end school, vocational training, or university education after December 31, [of the previous year]” to find the exit year. I 
then use the calendar to find the exit month.  
16 According to Martinot (2015), 24.4% of the apprentices in the dual system break their contract against 28.1% in 
France. Yet, among these, 45.5% begin a new contract in Germany against 22.1% in France.   
17 The average difference in the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rates between 1992 and 2013 is of 10.8 pp. 
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Figure 4. NEET rate on leaving the German secondary education 
Source : German Socio-Economic, own calculations 
students exiting higher education do worse than their German counterparts in the three post-
exit years to one exception: apprentices who left higher education have a similar NEET rates 
in t+3 as their German counterparts. As for secondary education, both French full-time 
students and ex-apprentices do similarly or better than their German counterparts in t+3 as 
for the NEET and the unemployment rates. French apprentices catch quicker their German 
counterparts since as soon as t+2, they exhibit an unemployment rate similar to these ones.  
Interestingly, the rise in the third post-exit year NEET rate of apprentices who left secondary 
education in Germany does not fully explain the closing gap with their French counterparts. 
The latter is indeed mostly rooted in the strong rise in maternity leave (similarly to non-
apprentices) which explains the pretty strong advantage French ex-apprentice women have 
on their German counterparts. Yet, the NEET rate for the German ex-apprentice males is 
very steady between t+2 and t+3 and French ex-apprentice males also do as well as the 
German ones in t+3.  
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Figure 3. Unemployment rate on leaving the German secondary 
education  
Source : German Socio-Economic, own calculations 
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As for the apprentices v.s. non-apprentices gap, it is – always but in two cases – larger in 
France than in Germany in each post-exit years for the two indexes and for either those 
exiting secondary or higher education when pooling the cohorts.  
Finally, note that the 2007 cohort in France endures a revival in unemployment as an effect 
of the crisis. It also induces a weaker reduction between apprentices’ and non-apprentices’ 
outcomes. If they also suffer from the economic downturn, apprentices could resist better 
relatively to full-time students18.  
3.2 Retention of apprentices per firm type 
Table 2 in Appendix 4 displays the retention rates of apprentices per firm type per the Arrighi 
and Brochier (2005) typology. In France, the categorization is based on the field of the 
18 The data for France does not offer more details on the content of inactivity when NEET. 
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apprenticeship track (the ‘Nomenclature des spécialités de formation’) whereas for Germany, 
I use the NACE (‘Nomenclature Statistique des Activités économiques’) code of the training 
firms. I only use the Western German observations from the secondary education cell due to 
a lack of accuracy of the Eastern German data on this matter and some limitations in the 
dataset. 
As now known in the literature, on average, Germany does better than France on this matter. 
The German outcomes are mostly driven by heavy industrial sectors but also by the fact that 
very few sectors exhibit a release rate lower than 50%. Strikingly, the retention rates in the 
French post-secondary education and post-higher education are close in average. This result 
suggests a more salient resort to current production strategies from French firms’ part in 
comparison with their German counterparts. Noteworthily, the German rate tends to strongly 
increase with the exit year19. Table 3 in Appendix 4 stresses the fact that this matter of fact is 
mostly driven by a recent increase in large firms’ retention of apprentices. This fact goes in 
line with Busemeyer’s (2009) and Busemeyer and Thelen’s (2011) description of the 
evolution of the German apprenticeship system. They describe a move from a collective 
training system where business organisations compel large firms to train over their need for 
the benefit of smaller companies to a segmentalist one where large firms either opt-out from 
these organisations or obtain lighter deals. In this segmentalist model, large firms would 
increasingly train for their own internal labour market and therefore provide apprentices an 
increasing part of firm-specific skills. This recent line of analysis urges to question whether 
the conclusions of the VoC literature on the level of coordination in Germany are still 
relevant after the recent institutional evolutions of the country. In particular, this is likely to 
negatively affect the “employability” of ex-apprentices on the external labour market. 
4. THE MODEL 
4.1 A risk of selection bias 
It is likely that apprentices have some common unobserved features since entering an 
apprenticeship track may not be randomly decided given the usual control variables. The 
literature has largely mentioned such a risk (Ryan, 1998; Sollogoub and Ulrich, 1999; 
Simonnet and Ulrich, 2000; Issehnane, 2011; Alet and Bonnal, 2011; Parey, 2012). Three 
methods are generally used to deal with it. The first one jointly estimates the equation of 
interest and the probability of following an apprenticeship through maximum likelihood 
technics (Issehnane, 2011). It requires strong assumptions on the joint-distribution of the 
residuals from the two equations. Due to a high lack of accuracy of this method when those 
assumptions do not stand (Chiburis, Das, and Lokshin, 2012), I do not use it. The second 
technique relies on a several-step estimation based on the maximum likelihood technic of the 
Barnow, Cain, Goldberger paper (1980) (Simonnet and Ulrich, 2000). Yet, as shown in 
Appendix A.5, this method does not fit with discrete second-step dependent variables and 
requires manipulation of the data with a risk of error in any case. As a result, the usual IV 
procedure is preferred despite the fact that the first stage dependent variable – and some 
second stage ones – is discrete (Parey, 2012). 
 
 
19 2007-2013 is one example, the trend is valid for smaller and larger windows. 
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4.2 The instrument 
As common in the literature, the instrument I use is the regional rate of apprenticeship which 
applies the year preceding the choice to enter an apprenticeship track or a full-time 
vocational one. For the French case, it accounts for the ratio of the number of apprentices in 
secondary (resp. higher) education relatively to the number of full time vocational students at 
the same level three years before the school exit. For Germany, the ratio I used is the one 
from secondary education tracks for both the analyses in the “secondary cell” and in the 
“higher education cell” since the dual system I study here takes place in secondary education. 
The ratio considered is the one applying at age 15 for those exiting school after secondary 
education and the one applying at age 16 for those exiting school after higher education20. 
In France, the 1983 law transferred the State prerogatives on apprenticeship training to the 
regions. The 1993 five-year law deepened the decentralization process. It transfers the whole 
jurisdiction on vocational training matters for the youth aged up to 26. The law also requires 
regions to decide of a regional plan on vocational training development for the youth. 
Alongside the transfer of prerogatives, State spending on the matter decreases. Regions are 
now responsible for about 23% of total spending on apprenticeship (two third of which are 
aimed at the ‘Centre de Formation d’Apprentis’). Reciprocally, this spending accounts for 
half of regions expenditures (Mainaud, 2007). Beginning in 1983, but mostly after 1993, 
local orientation of vocational training has therefore largely depended on each regional 
council’s ability and will to coordinate the numerous local stake holders in apprenticeship 
training as well as on their relationship with local businesses. One would therefore expect 
apprenticeship rates to explain individual decision to turn either to full time vocational 
training or to apprenticeship training. Regarding the exclusion restriction, these rates have no 
expected clear channel of effect on the outcome variables which therefore make them good 
instrument candidates. 
As for Germany, the major role of the lander is well-known. In particular, local and regional 
authorities are in charge of the spending on the school part of the dual system. They also 
essentially develop the curricula for general education at vocation schools (Hippach-
Schneider, Krause, and Woll, 2007). Moreover, firms can request assistance from their local 
employment office for the vacancies they could not manage to fill (Parey, 2012). Finally, on 
top of the lander’s prerogatives, the various Chambers are in charge of “advising companies, 
registering trainees, certifying trainers’ specialist aptitude, accepting examinations and 
conducting social dialogue at regional level” (Hippach-Schneider, Krause, and Woll, 2007). 
As such, it is both the role of the regional authorities and of the ‘competent bodies’ which are 
playing a role here. 
To this instrument, some authors have added the crossed effect of apprenticeship rates with a 
proxy for the level in the first year of secondary education (Alet and Bonnal, 2011) or the 
size of the city in where one lived at 11 (Simonnet and Ulrich, 2000). Yet, these variables 
seem to have an effect on the second stage dependent variables. For these reasons, I stick to 
using the apprenticeship rates as a singular instrument. 
 
 
 
20 Students leave the Hauptschule (resp. Realschule, Gymnasium) at age 15-16 (resp. 16-17, 16-18). 
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5. RESULTS  
The presentation of the results proceeds as follows. First, I work on short term outcomes 
which are built on the 12 first months following the school exit. I successively assess the 
effect of apprenticeship on the number of months in unemployment, the ratio of full-time 
employment over part time work and the first wage declared in this period. I then turn to 
medium-run outcomes built on the first 36 months following the school exit. As in Lopez 
(2004), I first consider the probability of experiencing a continuous period of employment 
(either part time or full time) of more than 18 months among these 36 months; next, I study 
the waiting time in months before this period begins; finally, I study the first wage declared 
after the 18th month of this working period. In a third step I break down each group by 
gender.  
In each case, regressions are separately led on students exiting secondary education and 
higher education. As previously stated, the treated group in the German higher education 
includes those who turned to university after passing an apprenticeship exam. The control 
group gathers all other students successfully leaving full time higher education. As for 
regressions on leavers from the German secondary education, apprentices are those who 
exited school after passing their exams of the dual-system track. The control group includes 
the school-leavers from full-time Berufsfachschule and Fachoberschule. In France, the 
treated groups are composed of those who exited school after successfully taking 
apprenticeship exams. In the secondary education cell, these are either a CAP, BEP, Bac Pro 
or Brevet professionnel. The control group therefore includes the students who passed these 
exams after a full-time vocational track. As for higher education, I focus on students leaving 
either a BTS or a DUT track (pooled), university or an engineering or business ‘grande 
école’ for both treated and control groups.  
The naïve regressions are either OLS, probit or poisson ones, depending on the type of the 
dependent variable (respectively the ratio full-time v.s. part-time employment and the wages; 
the probability to experience a stable period of employment; count variables including the 
number of months in unemployment and before the beginning of the period of stability). For 
France, I pool the 4 cohorts (1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007) in the tables displayed in the text. 
As for Germany, the lack of data prevents the gender analysis for those exiting higher 
education. It also urges to take cautiously the results from the IV analysis.  
5.1 First Stage 
The instrument has a strong influence on the probability of following an apprenticeship (see 
Table in Appendix A.6) in the two French cells. A 1 percentage point increase in the 
apprenticeship ratio inflates the likelihood to follow an apprenticeship by 0.57 p.p. in 
secondary education and by 0.83 p.p. in higher education. Two main explanations could be 
given here. First, apprenticeship is a rare good in France and students can struggle finding a 
firm where to be trained. The more numerous apprenticeship matches are a given year thanks 
to the regional council’s stand, the more numerous offers are likely to be the following year, 
first through the usual turnover of apprentices and second by a mimetic appeal for non-
training firms. In this case, compliers are likely to be those at the end of the waiting queue 
who are considered as the least able by the firms. Second, it is possible that the more the 
region develops apprenticeship, the more willing good students will be to enter an 
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apprenticeship track. Here, relatively to the average apprentice, the compliers are more likely 
to be successful students who have positively chosen to enter an apprenticeship track. In this 
view, the regional action on apprenticeship increases its appeal and compliers would rather 
be at the top of the waiting queue. As stated by Bordigoni (1995), apprenticeship at the 
secondary education level in France is “reserved to the young people in situation of school 
failure”. Apprentices often declare choosing these tracks as a last-resort option because they 
are not confident in their chances to access full-time professional or general high-schools. As 
a result, it is unlikely that a localized regional stand for apprenticeship training is sufficient to 
attract the best students. It is therefore likely that the first explanation applies to this cell. 
Conversely, apprenticeship in higher education is known for being more attractive and 
selective (Issehnane, 2011; Sanchez, 2004; Kergoat, 2010). As such, the second line of 
explanation would apply to it.  
As for Germany, the effect of the apprenticeship ratio is less straightforward. An 1 p.p. 
increase results in a 0.43 p.p. decrease in the likelihood to have gone through the dual system 
before exiting secondary education and in a 0.77 p.p. increase in the likelihood to have 
passed an apprenticeship diploma before exiting higher education. The most likely path of 
explanation here is one based on the competitive access to the dual system. Before 
developing it, I first assess the motive behind the strategy consisting in taking an 
apprenticeship before turning to higher education21. This is a two-step process which can be 
described in two different ways. The first one proceeds as follow: 1) the choice to take or not 
an apprenticeship track, 2) after the dual-system, the choice to go forward to higher education 
or to exit school. This view follows Herget (1997) and suggests that the strategy 
apprenticeship-higher education is not formalized at the time of exiting lower secondary 
education. Conversely, it implies that students ending up in higher education after an 
apprenticeship turned first to the dual system for similar reasons as those which drove the 
apprentices from the secondary cell towards an apprenticeship track22. Yet, the opposite sign 
of the coefficient in the secondary and higher cells questions this reasoning. Therefore, the 
following two-step process seems to better fit the results displayed here: 1) a student aims at 
entering higher education or not 2) she decides to enter the dual system (before higher 
education if (1) leads to it). This view follows Lewin et al (1996). It implies that students 
from the higher education cell who have taken the apprenticeship track beforehand are not 
the least able or/and the most risk-adverse ones in their cell as the first view suggested it, but, 
instead, are individuals active in their choice of study options. They expect a lack of practical 
training in higher education and are willing to compensate it (ibid). While the first view 
insists on the dividing line between apprentices and non-apprentices and describes the former 
as rather homogenous, the second view insists on the divide between the higher and the 
secondary cells and highlights the heterogeneity among apprentices. With this second view in 
mind, the signs of the coefficient are more straightforward to explain. When the region 
develops apprenticeship training, a larger number of offers are available on the market. As a 
result, the students who are aiming at entering higher education but consider going through 
the apprenticeship track are more likely to find offers of interest and therefore to enter the 
dual system. Those students are not struggling to access the dual system. On the contrary, 
they are rather at the top of the queue to find a training firm. This process results in a lower 
number of offers available for those at the end of the queue, namely the compliers of the 
21 Once again, the ex-apprentices in the higher education cell have passed a diploma from the dual system. 
22 Relatively low school results and risk aversion according to Büchel and Helbreger (1995). 
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secondary cell. For them, the more the region develops apprenticeship training, the more 
attractive it is for the rest of their cohort and the least chances they have to access it. In this 
regard, the compliers of the secondary cell would therefore be the least able students from the 
firms’ point of view.  
Regarding the observable characteristics, men have a stronger likelihood to enter 
apprenticeship with the exception of the German higher education cell. Moreover, despite the 
bad reputation generally ascribed to apprenticeship in French secondary education, students 
who repeated class(es) (proxied here by the fact of being older in 6è than normally expected) 
are less likely to enter an apprenticeship class. Table 4 in Appendix A.6 also highlights the 
role played by the parental origin. Having a father of a French nationality or born on the 
national soil increases the probability of following an apprenticeship in France. The 
equivalent does not apply in Germany. As for socio-professional groups, the workers are the 
most likely to have their children follow an apprenticeship in Germany whereas farmers, 
craftsmen, shopkeepers and business owners have so more often in France.  
5.2 Short-run effects of apprenticeship on employment and wages 
Results on the first 12 months following the school exit are displayed in Tables 5, 6 and 7 
(marginal effects are given). In both level groups in France and Germany, ex-apprentices 
experience better outcomes than full-time students regarding the unemployment rate. 
Interestingly, on average, French apprentices enjoy a better relative situation. The difference-
in-difference of non-unemployment gains between French and German apprentices with their 
respective control groups reaches 6 (resp. 6.5) percentage points after secondary (resp. 
higher) education in favour of French apprentices. In the two countries, the apprentices’ 
advantage could stem from two channels. The first one relates to the likelihood of being hired 
by the training firm, the second one is the relative position on the external labour market. It 
be can showed that, in France, the average advantage of apprentices in terms of 
unemployment stays positive when comparing apprentices non-hired by their training firm 
with the control group. In other words, on average in each level group, French apprentices 
are preferred to full-time students on the external labour market23.  
This is not true in Germany. There, the apprentices’ advantage stems firstly from the 
likelihood to be hired by the training firm. In other words, and relying on the previous 
descriptive statistics, French apprentices stay less often in their training firms but, once 
unemployed, find a job more easily than their German counterparts relatively to their 
respective control group. This could suggest that the content of training is less firm-specific 
in France than in Germany. The recent evolution of the German collective organizations 
would back this point. Against the VoC literature which states that a high level of 
coordination in Germany ensures that apprenticeship training involves sector- rather than 
firm-specific skills, Busemeyer (2009) and Busemeyer and Thelen (2011) describe German 
firms as increasingly training for their internal labour market and as such as providing more 
and more firm-specific skills. According to Dustmann and Schönberg (2007, 6), only 5% of 
the skills provided in apprenticeship training are firm-specific. Yet, they base their analysis 
on apprenticeship contracts taking place between 1980 and 1992. The extent to which this 
matter of facts has evolved is not clear and more research is needed on the topic. Note that 
the above mentioned result could also suggest that employers’ preferences for specific skills 
23 The result – available on demand – is a lower bound since apprentices hired by their training firms are likely to be the 
most employable ones.  
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– here understood as sector-specific since we consider the external labour market rather than 
the training firm’s internal one – in Germany have evolved towards more general skills since 
MSS’ work. 
As for the average treatment effect (ATE hereafter) effect on wages, it is positive in both 
French cells whereas it is negative after secondary education and null after higher education 
in Germany. The negative correlation after the German secondary education applies to both 
the apprentices hired by their training firm and those who look for a job on the external 
market. It must be discussed here, especially as it goes against the previous literature 
(Winkelmann, 1996; Büchel and Helberger, 1995; Riphahn and Zibrowius, 2015; Parey, 
2012). Note first that this literature mostly focuses on Western Germany before the 2000s. 
More generally, two different lines of explanation can be provided. First, the German labour 
market is filled with a very large stock of apprenticeship graduates. Apprentices exiting 
school after secondary education therefore have a larger number of competitors on the labour 
market than full-time students do. As such, while they benefit from a larger probability to 
find a job thanks to the opportunity of being hired in their former training firm, the relative 
stronger competition they experience on the labour market could result in lower wages. The 
second line of explanation boils down to the fact that students exiting school right after their 
apprenticeship have often not benefited from a good training (see Section 1.1). As a result, 
their productivity is likely to be lower than the one of the control group, thereby resulting in 
lower wages. Note that the competition to find an apprenticeship position has been increasing 
which could be another reason explaining why the previous literature – which uses older 
data–mostly finds no effect.  
Finally, regarding the probability to work full time v.s. part time, here again on average, 
apprentices experience an advantage over full-time students after secondary education in the 
two countries and after higher education in France only. For the former, the advantage is 
similar in the two countries when gender is given. Yet, women are relatively more likely to 
take a full-time track in Germany than in France, thereby biasing the overall difference to the 
advantage of Germany.  
 
The local average treatment effect (LATE hereafter24) in the French secondary education is 
larger than the ATE one in terms of the unemployment rate and of the type of contract. Yet, 
the positive ATE effect for the wage dies out when selection is addressed. As discussed 
above, compliers here seem to be students who struggled to find a training firm and would 
have been constrained to enter full-time training would there not be a regional policy able to 
have firms enroll in this type of training. With this in mind, the LATE results can be 
explained as follows. I focus first on the ATE and LATE on wages. The educational 
literature has evidenced that apprenticeship training is best suited for the least academically 
inclined students (Unwin and Wellington, 1995; Lerman and Pouncy, 1990). The compliers 
such as described above should therefore be among those gaining the most skills out of a 
given apprenticeship training relatively to full-time vocational training. As a result, their 
lesser advantage in terms of wage is likely to stem from heterogeneity in apprenticeship 
contracts25. It is indeed likely that the compliers have access to a training of a lesser quality 
24 The LATE effect is the causal effect of apprenticeship training on compliers. The ATE effect does not address 
selection and therefore is only a correlation when observable characteristic are given. 
25 This LATE on wage contributes to the literature which is unclear on this point for school leavers from secondary 
education (negative effect in Sollogoub and Ulrich, 1999; no effect in Simonnet and Ulrich, 2000 and Isshenane, 2011 
and positive effect in Abriac, 2009). 
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providing them a lower amount of skills than the rest of their cohort (see Section 1.1). An 
element backing this idea is the fact that, contrarily to the ATE on the unemployment 
outcome, the LATE fades away when considering only the apprentices who were not kept by 
their training firm26. As a result, as exhibited by the non-significant LATE on wages, when 
employed, ex-apprentices seem to have a productivity level similar to the one they would 
exhibit would they have followed a full-time track. Therefore, for these students, the main 
advantage provided by apprenticeship training is the higher probability of avoiding 
unemployment thanks to the possible retention by the training firm27. This result therefore 
emphasizes the very poor outcomes in terms of unemployment compliers would suffer had 
they followed a full-time vocational track. This reasoning finally highlights the fact that an 
increase in apprenticeship rate is welcome if it is not to the detriment of firms’ retention rate. 
In this regard, the effect of subsidies in particular is not straight forward. They are likely to 
increase the apprenticeship rate but also to foster current production strategies, see Section 2. 
As for the LATE in the secondary education cell in Germany, the ATE seems to fade away in 
the case of the full-time v.s. part-time ratio and of the wage when selection is taken into 
account – though discussion on these two outcomes should be cautiously taken considering 
the low F-test statistics. More conclusive is the LATE on the number of unemployed months 
among the 12 first post-exit months. Rather than the value of the point estimate which is very 
high due to large standard errors, its sign is more interesting to discuss. As stated in 
Section 5.1, compliers here are the students likely to be situated at the end of the waiting 
queue for apprenticeship contracts. As such, and since the German labour market is 
characterized with a large stock of ex-apprentices, it is straight-forward to understand that 
they are likely to experience difficulties to find a job after their apprenticeship. More 
specifically, this result highlights the fact that the compliers are likely to end up in a low 
quality apprenticeship where a relatively28 low likelihood to be hired by the training firm 
makes the full-time track a better alternative for them.  
As for higher education in the two countries, the LATE are all but in one exception non-
significant29. This result is in line with the literature on this issue for France (Issehnane, 
2011; Sanchez, 2004) and highlights the selectivity at stake in apprenticeship tracks of higher 
education. The compliers are good students in the two countries (see Section 5.1) who would 
have managed as well through full-time training. The high level of subsidies used on 
apprenticeship training in the French higher education seems therefore hard to justify.  
26 Hence emphasizing the lack of strength of the French collective organizations willing to limit current production 
strategies. 
27 Importantly, this does not mean that retention rates are higher for the compliers than for non-compliers. On the 
contrary, the opposite is likely (see Section 1.1 and 1.2). 
28 Once again, the likelihood to be hired in  the training firm must be considered in relation to the average retention rate 
as well as to the full-time students’ outcomes 
29 This case is hard to explain and would need more research. It is a possibility that ex-apprentices favour more part time 
when having kids than full-time students. In any case, it seems hard to link with the type of jobs occupied. 
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) 'Super-region' fixed effect for the IV regressions. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
 
  
Table 5. Marginal effect of apprenticeship training on unemployment 
 
Exit from Secondary Education Exit from Higher Education 
 
Germany France Ger. Males Ger. Females Fr. Males Fr. Females Ger. IV Fr. IV Germany France Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV Ger. IV 
  Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV IV Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Apprenticeship -0.66*** -1.39*** -1.25*** -0.52*** -1.11*** -1.87*** 6.34* -2.340* -0.21** -0.98*** -0.99*** -0.90*** 1.093 0.76 
  (0.11) (0.03) (0.19) (0.13) (0.03) (0.07) (3.86) (1.354) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (2.790) (1.93) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm 
characteristics 
  
  
 
  
 
    
  
  
 
  
 Cohort fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed 
effect (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,446 18,217 646 800 11,601 6,616 1,005 18,217 885 25,673 12,043 13,630 25,673 478 
First stage F-
statistic             9.592 184.6         17.92 11.63 
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Table 6. Marginal effect of apprenticeship training on the ratio full-time v.s. part time work over the first post-exit year 
 
Exit from Secondary Education Exit from Higher Education 
 
Germany France Ger. Males Ger. Females Fr. Males Fr. Females Ger. IV Fr. IV Germany France Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV Ger. IV 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Apprenticeship 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.11*** -0.01 0.130* 0.01 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.13*** -0.137 -0.29* 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.22) (0.0729) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.266) (0.17) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics 
  
  
 
  
 
    
  
  
 
  
 Cohort fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effect (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,293 15,365 589 704 10,335 5,030 901 15,365 803 23,321 11,024 12,297 23,321 427 
First stage F-statistic             7.868 148.4         17.21 14.26 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
(1) 'Super-region' fixed effect for the IV regressions  
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
 
  
32 
Comparative Analysis of Apprenticeship Training in France and Germany 
Table 7. Marginal effect of apprenticeship training on the first declared log-wage of a full-time job in the first post-exit year 
 
Exit from Secondary Education Exit from Higher Education 
 
Germany France Ger. Males Ger. Females Fr. Males Fr. Females Ger. IV Fr. IV Germany France Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV Ger. IV 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Apprenticeship -0.10** 0.01*** -0.08 -0.09* 0.01** 0.02** 0.78 -0.0221 0.00 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.152 0.23 
  (0.04) (0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.0549) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.143) (0.22) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effect (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 621 12,617 297 324 9,373 3,244 442 12,617 423 19,645 9,847 9,798 19,645 233 
First stage F-statistic             4.599 103.7         14.62 12.20 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) 'Super-region' fixed effect for the IV regressions.  
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
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5.3 Medium-run effects of apprenticeship training on stability in 
employment and on medium-run wages 
Table 8 provides information on the probability to experience a period of continuing 
employment longer than 18 months over the 36 first months after the school exit. Table 9 
deals with the waiting time in months before such a period and Table 10 displays the effect 
of apprenticeship training on the first wage declared after the 18th month of this period. 
Medium run effects of apprenticeship on stability in employment follow the same pattern as 
the short run ones previously described. Thus, on average, apprentices benefit from a 
stronger likelihood to experience a period of stable work. The effect is of 14 p.p. (resp. 
8 p.p.) after exiting the French (resp. German) secondary education and it is of 9 p.p. (resp. 
4 p.p. but not significant) when leaving higher education. The advantage of apprentices is 
also more important in France than in Germany with respect to the waiting time before 
experiencing such a period. The IV estimates confirm the existence in France of a negative 
selection bias for apprentices in secondary education and of a positive selection bias for 
apprentices in higher education. The German dataset does not provide enough power for an 
IV estimate in these cases. 
As for wages, the average advantage benefitting to French apprentices similarly lasts more 
than a year and a half in both secondary and higher education. More precisely, it is still 
salient in the 36th month after school30. Yet, as for the short-run wage, the IV estimates fail to 
ascribe these advantages to the very apprenticeship tracks in the case of the compliers. As for 
Germany, the disadvantage for apprentices exiting school after secondary education is 
similarly persistent. 
5.4 Discussion of the gender bias 
Finally, I discuss the previous outcomes with respect to gender. On a general rule, men do 
better than women in France with respect to all the outcomes considered. In Germany, results 
are a bit more mitigated but the pattern is similar. It is interesting to note that, both after 
secondary and higher education, the wage difference between men and women is similar in 
the two countries at the school-exit time but is much more important in Germany in the 
medium-run (tables not displayed here).  
If one separately runs the naïve regressions on men and women, it appears that, in France, the 
correlation exhibited is stronger for women to the only exception of the time spent in 
unemployment after higher education. In Germany, the effect is less clear-cut for students 
leaving secondary education. The relative average advantage of men and women is stronger 
for the latter in terms of the ratio full-time v.s. part-time work and the likelihood to 
experience a stable period of employment, while it is to the advantage of the former in terms 
of short-run unemployment and of short- and medium-run wage levels. Developing 
apprenticeship tracks seems therefore to be a reasonable policy in favour of the quality of 
women’s work-to-school transition. The main point of interest is the strong advantage of ex-
apprentices with respect to the likelihood of full-time work in both countries and, more 
clearly for France than for Germany, the shortening effect of apprenticeship on 
unemployment spells.  
30 Result not displayed here, available on demand 
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Table 8. Probability to experience an employment spell of 18 months over the first 36 post-exit months 
 
Exit from Secondary Education Exit from Higher Education 
 
Germany France Ger. Males Ger. Females Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV Germany France Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV 
  Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit IV Probit Probit Probit Probit IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Apprenticeship 0.08** 0.14*** 0.00 0.11** 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.388*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.247 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.115) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.382) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
 Cohort fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effect (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 987 18,217 426 538 11,601 6,616 18,217 602 25,673 12,043 13,630 25,673 
First stage F-statistic             184.6         17.92 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) 'Super-region' fixed effect for the IV regressions. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
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Table 9. Waiting time before the beginning of the period described in Table 7 
 
Exit from Secondary Education Exit from Higher Education 
 
Germany France Ger. Males Ger. Females Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV Germany France Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV 
  Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Apprenticeship -0.38** -1.54*** 0.67* -0.41 -1.20*** -2.45*** -2.167** -0.31 -1.84*** -1.57*** -2.10*** 6.422 
  (0.20) (0.04) (0.37) (0.26) (0.04) (0.09) (0.917) (0.21) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (5.363) 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
 Cohort fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effect (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 727 12,935 322 405 9,001 3,934 12,935 559 19,995 9,712 10,283 19,995 
First stage F-statistic             133.1         13.07 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) 'Super-region' fixed effect for the IV regressions. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
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Table 10. Marginal effect of apprenticeship on the first log-wage declared for a full time job after the 18th of the period of stability 
 
Exit from Secondary Education Exit from Higher Education 
 
Germany France Ger. Males Ger. Females Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV Germany France Fr. Males Fr. Females Fr. IV 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Apprenticeship -0.09*** 0.02*** -0.09 -0.10*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.000631 0.04 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.247 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.0654) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.382) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effect 
(1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 458 9,867 208 250 7,488 2,379 9,867 361 25,673 12,043 13,630 25,673 
First stage F-statistic           82.73         17.92 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) 'Super-region' fixed effect for the IV regressions. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I compare the effect of apprenticeship training in France and Germany on the 
short-run and medium-run. I separately lead the estimations on students exiting school after 
secondary education and higher education in each country. For France, this is straight-
forward since apprenticeship is available at mostly all levels. For Germany, the treated group 
in higher education is composed of students who followed a higher education track after 
completing an apprenticeship in the secondary education. The causal effect of apprenticeship 
training is studied in an IV setting where the instrument is the ratio of apprentices over full-
time students in studies at the corresponding level the year before the individual choice is to 
be made.  
The descriptive statistics show that the overall difference in youth unemployment between 
the two countries is mostly driven by the 24 first post-exit months. I then highlight that 
apprenticeship training is on average broadly associated with stronger positive outcomes in 
France than in Germany for students exiting both secondary and higher education. This is 
first the case of the short-run effect on employability. The relative advantage when exiting 
the French secondary education is equivalent to a differential of 11.6 percentage points while 
it is of 5.5 p.p. in Germany at the same level during the first post-exit year. After higher 
education, it drops to an equivalent of 8.2 p.p. in France against 1.7 p.p. in Germany. The 
apprentices’ advantage persists on the medium run in France since apprenticeship is 
associated with a larger probability of experiencing a stable period of more than 18 months in 
both the secondary education cell and the higher education one during the first 36 post-exit 
months. To a lesser extent, this is true as well among the German students exiting school 
after secondary education. Conversely, in the German higher education cell, apprenticeship 
training is only associated with positive outcomes on the short-run. Note that, in the cells 
where it is significant, this medium-run effect comes with a shorter waiting time before the 
period of employment stability.  
The channel explaining the relative advantage of ex-apprentices seems to differ between the 
two countries. I provide pieces of proof evidencing that the short-run advantage of German 
apprentices is mostly rooted in the high retention rate of the training firms, which suggests 
that German employers are not privileging apprentices when hiring on the external labour 
market. Conversely, the retention rate exhibited in France is low. Yet, on the external labour 
market, firms seem to privilege ex-apprentices (therefore trained elsewhere) to full-time 
students. These results put into question the relevance for the current period of the traditional 
institutionalist literature on the issue. First, Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre (1979) have 
described French employers as valuing more strongly general content in skill training than 
specific one to the contrary of German employers. This does not seem to hold here since full-
time vocational training provides more general skills. Second, the literature of the Varieties 
of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) has described Germany as a country where relations 
of coordination between private actors should ensure that apprentices are taught skills 
relevant for their sector, thereby implying an advantage on the external market. The results 
described here similarly mitigate this point. Relying on Busemeyer (2009) and Busemeyer 
and Thelen (2011), I consider the recent evolution of the German model of skill formation as 
a candidate for explaining this fact. These authors describe a move from a collective training 
system where business organisations compel large firms to train over their need to the benefit 
of smaller companies to a segmentalist one where large firms either opt-out from these 
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organisations or bargain lighter deals. In this segmentalist model, large firms would 
increasingly train for their own internal labour market and therefore provide apprentices an 
increasing part of firm-specific skills. The descriptive statistics I provide on the retention 
rates seem to back this point. 
I then show that apprenticeship training is associated with a stronger likelihood to work full-
time rather than part-time at all levels in France and after secondary education in Germany. 
The effect is close in the two countries in the secondary education cell when gender is given. 
Finally, regarding wages, while French apprentices earn more than full-time students after 
school both on the short and medium run when observable characteristics are given, there is 
no significant correlation in the higher education cell in Germany and apprenticeship is 
associated with a lower income in the secondary cell. This latter result has to be taken 
cautiously since it goes against most of the literature on the issue – which yet uses older-
dated datasets. It could evidence a declining position of the apprentices exiting school after 
secondary education in the competition on the labour market. In particular, the rising number 
of apprentices exiting school after higher education could be an element of explanation. 
 
The analysis of the LATE brings three main types of results. First, the instrument I use is the 
ratio of apprentices over full-time students prevailing at the time of the choice to enter or not 
an apprenticeship track. I provide some elements suggesting that the compliers in the 
secondary cell of both France and Germany are rather low school achievers who are at the 
bottom of the waiting line in the applications for apprenticeship training and would struggle 
to find a firm would there not be a regional stand in favour of apprenticeship training. In the 
higher education cells, compliers would rather be good students whose choice to enter an 
apprenticeship track depends on the availability of good apprenticeship positions. Second is 
the causal effect in terms of employability. In the French secondary education, the causal 
local average treatment effect (LATE) is stronger than the average treatment effect (ATE). 
The former is mostly driven by the retention rate of the compliers: contrarily to the ATE, the 
LATE effect fades out when restricting the treated group to those who have not been hired in 
their training firm. Yet, it is first known that the compliers such as described above are not 
benefiting from high retention rates in France. Second, the null LATE on wages implies that 
the training compliers receive is of a very poor quality, especially since the education 
literature suggests they should be among those benefitting the most from practical training. 
Therefore, more than anything else, this result highlights the very poor outcomes of these 
students first when they are not hired by their training firm and second when they do not 
follow a full-time vocational track. As for the German secondary education, the IV study 
shows a significant causal effect of apprenticeship training only on the number of months 
spent unemployed in the first post-year exit. Interestingly, and contrary to the previous 
literature (Parey, 2012), it is positive. Note however that I use more recent data, include 
Eastern Germany in the study, and work on a slightly different instrumental channel. Given 
the previous discussion, compliers are likely to benefit from a training of a lesser quality than 
the average (see Section 1.1). This especially matters when the apprentice is not retained by 
the training firm. Non-retained compliers are entering an external labour market filled with 
ex-apprentices where their credentials stands out not thanks to the nature of their diploma – 
as it would be the case in France – but rather because of the low quality apprenticeship they 
followed. Moreover, contrarily to the French case, the positive LATE effect suggests as a 
mirror image pretty good outcomes of the compliers had they taken a full-time vocational 
course. Third, regressions highlight no effect of apprenticeship training in the French and 
German higher education cells with the exception of the ratio full-time v.s. part-time training 
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in Germany which seems difficult to account for. As a result, the average advantage 
experienced by apprentices in these cells for all outcomes in France and for the short-run 
employability in Germany at least partly stems from the high quality of the treated group. 
These results provide some applications for public policies in the French context. First, the 
German case shows that, as apprenticeship training grows in importance in a country, there 
may be a limit in the benefits it can provide to the low school achievers. Second, in line with 
the discussion on the descriptive statistics, it seems that improving the quality of full-time 
vocational training in the French secondary education may be of an even importance as is the 
increase in the apprenticeship rate. Third, fostering apprenticeship training against full-time 
vocational training at the secondary education level seems to benefit compliers through an 
only one channel: the possible retention in the training firm. In terms of public policy, this 
suggests that an increase in apprenticeship rates obtained through a rise in subsidies is 
therefore not necessarily suited since they exert a positive incentive on using apprentices as 
cheap labour (see the “current production strategies” described in Section 1). Conditioning 
subsidies on both an average retention rate of apprentices per firm on a medium time span 
and on a better quality of training at this level would therefore be advisable. Note that the 
latter would necessitate a stronger monitoring of apprenticeship training either by the Trade 
and Craft Chambers as in the German model or by the State. Last, the absence of causal 
effect of apprenticeship training in higher education urges to inverse the trend initiated in the 
early 1990s which has seen a strong development of apprenticeship training at this level 
while it was decreasing in importance in secondary education. In particular, subsidies seem 
to be more efficient if targeted at the secondary level, once again conditional on the fact that 
the resulting increase in apprenticeship training is not taking place through contracts with no 
hiring expectation.  
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APPENDIX 
A.1 The French and German education systems  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of students leaving lower secondary education and of the whole 
population 
 Population in 1990 Cohort graduating  in 1990 Population in 2012 
Cohort graduating  
in 2012 
Hauptschule 61.6 % 24.6 % 35.6 % 18.1 % 
Realschule and  Oberschule 19.3 % 35.0 % 29.0 % 39.7 % 
Hochschulreife and 
Fachhochschulreife 14.7 % 33.8 % 27.3 % 35.1 % 
Drop out or other 4.4 % 2.6 % 8.1 % 7.1 % 
Source: Winkelman (1996) and Destatis, own calculations. 
 
A.2 The hold-up puzzle 
Despite the incentives previously stated, it is not straightforward why a firm would bear 
negative net training costs since, once trained, apprentices can be ‘poached’ by external firms 
(thus cancelling the future benefits expected by the training company). The literature has 
underlined several answers to this ‘hold-up’ puzzle. Becker (1962) forecasts that to avoid it, a 
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firm will only invest in (i.e. pay for) firm-specific human capital. The lack of portability of 
these skills indeed suppresses the poaching risk. In his theory students would be the ones 
paying for their training in general (i.e. portable and therefore ‘poachable’) skills. Yet, the 
literature has proven the theory to be insufficient (Ryan and Wolter, 2011). In Germany for 
instance, Dustmann and Schönberg (2007:6) show that firm-specific skills training account 
for only 5-percent of total apprenticeship training. The rest boils down to 35% of sector-
specific skills, therefore leaving 60% of general skills. Becker’s model is framed in the 
framework of pure and perfect competition. But the ‘hold up’ situation strongly mitigates 
when rigidities apply.  
Thus, the regulatory standards of training can only account for the minimum content of 
general training a firm has to provide. The rest of it is therefore left to its discretion and 
unknown from external firms which therefore have to bear an information-based cost to find 
the true productivity of an ex-apprentice (Katz and Tiderman, 1990). This leaves a surplus 
that training firms can earn out of their investment in human capital. An asymmetry of 
information also occurs regarding the ability of post-apprentices. Assume a low-ability type 
and a high-ability type of apprentices. Assume external firms to be unable to fully observe 
the ability of a given apprentice – for instance if certification is not informative enough. In 
this case, for a given level of certification, the same wage will be offered to both types. By 
offering jobs only to high-ability apprentices and paying them a small bit above the market 
wage, the training firm manages to have them stay after their training period and ensures a 
benefit: the apprenticeship works here as a screening device. In the end, this theoretical case 
provides incentive to increase general training for apprentices. First, since general training is 
generally considered as a complement to ability (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998), the training 
firm has the incentive to invest in it in order to increase the difference between the high 
ability type’s productivity and the market price. Second, in this setup, the market for post-
apprentices free to be hired is fully composed of low-ability individuals, therefore leading 
external firms to train their own apprentices.  
On top of the role of asymmetry of information, two major arguments can justify the training 
in portable skills. First, in a situation where external firms have a limited ability to ‘poach’ 
due to information asymmetry, the more compressed the market wages are, the higher the 
firms’ incentive to train is since the productivity/wage ratio increases with the skills and 
ability in this case (Stevens, 1994b; Acemoglu and Pishcke, 1999a). Second, given that sets 
of general and specific skills are not valued to the same extent by all firms, a company may 
invest in a set of general and specific training which is less valued by external competitors 
(Ryan and Wolter, 2011). In this case, the trainee is less likely to be poached than in the pure 
and perfect competition framework: the firms’ monopsony power explains part of the above-
mentioned poor fit of Becker’s predictions with reality. 
Regarding my empirical case, it is not clear which of the two countries has the higher level of 
rigidities. Wage compression is equivalent between the two countries in the lower half of the 
distribution but stronger in Germany in the upper part (Verdugo, 2014: Table 3). The level of 
asymmetry of information is likely to be higher in France due to the lesser importance of 
business Chambers there. They indeed enjoy a lesser institutionalized power and are less able 
to aggregate firms’ private information: whereas they are “considered trustworthy” in 
Germany, in France “businesses are suspicious of chambers for fear they are more creatures 
of the state than representatives of industry” (Soskice, 1994:42). 
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A.3 Historical explanation of the difference in the ratio 
apprenticeship/full time vocational training in France and Germany 
In France, students can access vocational education mostly through full time tracks. 
Conversely, Germany favours apprenticeship. 4.7% of all German employees were 
apprentices in 2007 against 1.7% of French ones in 2008 (Steedman, 2010). Moreover, the 
State has a major role in managing the apprenticeship system in France whereas, in Germany, 
firms are known as the “natural and main operator of initial vocational education” (Lasserre, 
2011:14). 
These discrepancies stem from the unequal fate of collective organisations in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. In France, the Allarde decree and the Le Chapelier law abolished corporations in 
1791 and outlawed any training for the youth if collectively set up. Rooted in a liberal 
political philosophy, this legislation clamps down on the main producers of norms in VET 
matters (Lemercier, 2007). It leads to the growth of on-the-job training with no regulation, 
diploma nor contract (Lequin, 1989; Troger, 1993). Conversely, in Germany, the mid-19th 
century laws hostile to corporations had little effect and are short-lasting. In a context where 
the working class’ social democratic claims grow and where the elite’s liberal ideology stay 
strong, the Conservatives and Centre parties see in the independent craft sector a political 
ally in favour of the establishment (Thelen, 2004). As a result, craft chambers are 
institutionalized: handcraft firms are required to register to them in 1897 and they are granted 
a monopoly for apprenticeship training in 1908 (ibid). 
Facing a common need in skilled workers generated by the industrial revolutions but a 
different institutional context, strategic firms (engineering industries in particular) therefore 
exert a differentiated lobby pressure on their respective State from the early 20th century to 
the 1960s. In France, in the absence of branch agreement, skills learnt in factory schools are 
barely transferable and are of a disparate quality. Moreover, investment costs that firms 
endure for these schools are not always bringing the expected returns since numerous smaller 
firms not engaged in training are able to offer higher wages thereby ‘poaching’ the 
postapprentices (Rojot, 2014). Despite its liberal aspirations, the ‘Association Française pour 
le Développement de l’Enseignement Technique’ (AFDET) – which was set up in 1902 and is 
mostly funded by the metal industry – therefore calls for a stronger State intervention to 
ensure a diploma standardization and to limit ‘poaching’ behaviors. The lobbying pressure is 
successful since the national CAP diploma, the requirement to train apprentices out of the 
workplace and the ‘apprenticeship tax’ are set up in the inter-war period (Brucy and Troger, 
2000; Dayan, 2013). 
In Germany at the same time, the main difficulty experienced by modern firms is to attract 
the brightest students in their in-house schools (Thelen, 2004). The main incentive of 
students and their parents to follow a training course is the insurance of diploma sanctioning 
their success at the end of the track (Webb and Webb, 1897). Yet, as said above, firms from 
craft chambers then have a monopoly to offer such apprenticeship diplomas. As a result, the 
lobbying group DATSCH – set up in 1908 by the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI) and the 
Verband Deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbau (VDMA) – pressures the State to recognize 
the right of business and trade chambers to collectively organize and sanction apprenticeship 
training (Thelen, 2004). The claim will turn into law in 1935. The 1969 law on 
apprenticeship only changed at the margin the pre-existing system by incorporating unions in 
the co-management of apprenticeship. As a result the choice of imperial Germany to grant 
craft chambers a monopoly in apprenticeship training conditioned the agents’ strategic 
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behavior and initiated the path which led the country to a strong level of subsidiarity in VET 
matters. 
In France, triggered by a low level of business collective organization in the early 20th 
century, State intervention in vocational training increased after WWII. Against the French 
Communist Party, the anti-communists unions F.O. and F.E.N turn to be natural allies to the 
Socialists who are at the head of the Direction Générale de l’Enseignement Technique 
(DGET) between 1948 and 1951 (Troger, 1989, 1993). These unions are opposing the 
working-class ethos of the PCF. They therefore urge the DGET to privilege full time 
vocational tracks to apprenticeship training in the Centres d’Apprentissage (CAs) (ibid). This 
process results in the integration of the collèges d’enseignement technique (CETs ‒ new 
name of the CAs) under the management of the lycées and colleges in the early 1960s. Large 
industrial firms do not oppose the rapprochement between apprenticeship training and full 
time public vocational training (Charlot and Figeat, 1985). Net training costs are indeed 
growing due to the costs resulting from technological innovation and the low returns on 
investments stemming from ‘poaching’ behaviors that a persisting low level of collective 
organization cannot prevent (Niell, 1954). Morevoer, factory schools are increasingly 
struggling to attract good students and prove not to be as flexible as expected relatively to 
public schools (Hatzfeld, 1996; Quenson, 1996; Gallet, 1996). The major role of the State in 
vocational training and the predominance of full time vocational training over apprenticeship 
training are therefore rooted in that period in France with the tacit agreement of strategic 
firms who have been facing a lack of employers’ collective organization since the 1791 anti-
corporatist laws. 
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A.4 Retention of apprentices by the training firms 
Table 2. Retention of apprentices per sector 
  Western Germany Sec. France Sec. France Sup 
  Mean 2007-2013 Mean 1998 2001 2004 Mean 1998 2004 
Agriculture, Environment 48% 68% 39% 32% 42% 43% 47% 21% 57% 
Building, Civil engineering, Working of wood, glass or other building materials 47% 44% 48% 39% 52% 50% 42% 23% 63% 
Metalworking 55% 55% 45% 38% 49% 47% 32% 52% 20% 
Motor vehicle mechanics 58% 62% 31% 25% 32% 35% 46%  
47% 
Food industry, Cooking 70% 65% 27% 25% 27% 29% 46% 77% 43% 
Other type of mechanics, Electricity 55% 81% 43% 36% 46% 45% 40% 41% 40% 
Chemical, nuclear, rubber or plastic industrial technologies 64% 54% 42% 47% 31% 61% 37% 27% 42% 
Business 39% 27% 28% 26% 21% 37% 43% 65% 36% 
Transport, Logistics 80% 80% 53% 55% 52% 51% 61% 70% 57% 
Management, Finance or Real estate 61% 83% 20% 15% 15% 44% 40% 49% 37% 
Hair Care and Aesthetic services    
34% 22% 37% 39% 
 
34% 
 
Health, Social Work  42% 57% 47% 44% 48% 48% 58% 23% 67% 
Hotel Sector, Tourism or Leisure activities 46% 45% 36% 26% 37% 46% 52% 52% 53% 
Information and communication 63% 70% 39% 33% 38% 64% 33% 9% 39% 
Other community services    
80% 38% 
  83% 
29% 83% 
Other 35% 71% 60% 31% 79% 38% 42% 22% 50% 
Mean 56% 61% 38% 32% 40% 42% 42% 38% 43% 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
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Table 3. Retention of apprentices per firm size in Western Germany 
 1992-2013 2007-2013 
Less than 20 employees 36% 37% 
Between 20 and 200 employees 62% 65% 
More than 200 employees 64% 76% 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, own calculations. 
 
 
A.5 Two possible estimation technics to take into account the selection 
bias 
Formally, the estimation writes as  
�𝑦𝑦1
∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑢1                         (1)
𝑦𝑦2∗ = 𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2 + 𝑢𝑢2                                    (2)
 
with 𝛼𝛼 a dummy variable which equals one if the individual ended school after an 
apprenticeship diploma, 𝑋𝑋1 and 𝑋𝑋2 two sets of covariables, 𝑦𝑦2∗ the latent variable such as 
𝛼𝛼 = 1 is equivalent to  𝑦𝑦2∗ ≥ 0 and 𝑦𝑦1∗ the main dependent variable which can be either 
observed or not.  
If 𝑢𝑢1 and 𝑢𝑢2are further assumed to be linearly related through the expression  𝑢𝑢1 = 𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎1
𝜎𝜎2
𝑢𝑢2 +
𝑣𝑣 with 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 the standard error of residual 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣 some noise independent from 𝑢𝑢1 and 𝑢𝑢2, the 
problem can be re-shaped as  
𝑦𝑦1∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎1
𝜎𝜎2
 (𝑦𝑦2∗ − 𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2) + 𝑣𝑣 
.Which therefore leads to : 
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1∗ /𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, 𝑦𝑦2∗)  =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎1
𝜎𝜎2
 (𝑦𝑦2∗ − 𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2)                  (3)  
        Thus, a selection bias in the estimation of 𝛼𝛼 appears when 𝜌𝜌 is non-null. Contrarily, if 𝜌𝜌 
is zero, equation (1) can be estimated on its own.  
The joint estimation of the equations by maximum likelihood requires to assume that 𝑢𝑢1and 
𝑢𝑢2 follow a binormal law: �𝑢𝑢1𝑢𝑢2� → 𝑁𝑁��
0
0�, �
    𝜎𝜎12          𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎2
𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎2          𝜎𝜎22
 �� (Lollivier 2001 et 2002 ; Robin 
2000). Yet, this assumption is strong and it has been proven that when it does not stand, the 
joint estimation leads to poorer results than a usual IV estimate (Chiburis et al, 2011) 
A two-step method could therefore be preferred to decrease the strength of the assumptions 
necessary to the estimation. Without assuming the normality of 𝑣𝑣, one can show that 
𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢2/𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝛼𝛼 = 1)   
et 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢2/𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝛼𝛼 = 0) are two Mills’ ratios (Arendt et Holm, 2006). Hence, if one sets  
 
𝜆𝜆1 =
𝜙𝜙(𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2)
Φ(𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2)
  
𝜆𝜆2 =
−𝜙𝜙(𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2)
1−Φ(𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2)
  
𝜇𝜇 = 𝜆𝜆1𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆2(1 − 𝛼𝛼)  
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and calls 𝜂𝜂 a residual, one can write: 
  
𝑦𝑦1∗ =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎1𝜇𝜇 + 𝜂𝜂           (4) 
The two-step method defined in Barnow, Cain et Goldberger (1981) boils down to first estimating 
𝛽𝛽2� in (2), so that  ?̂?𝜇 =
𝜙𝜙�𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2��
Φ�𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2��
𝛼𝛼 + −𝜙𝜙�𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2
��
1−Φ�𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2��
 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) can be used as an estimate for 𝜇𝜇 in (4) 
to obtain an unbiased OLS estimation of 𝛼𝛼. Note that standard errors have to be bootstrapped 
(Lee, Maddala and Trost, 1980). Bayart (2009 :chap7) further explains the difference with a 
usual IV procedure.  
Importantly enough, a limit to this later method appears when 𝑦𝑦1∗is unobserved. 
Indeed, in this case, the assumption that 𝜂𝜂is normal is necessary for the estimation whereas 
this is not necessarily the case in (4) (Lollivier, 20012). The second stage has to be estimated 
by “linear least squares regression” (Barnow, Cain and Goldberger, 1981:25, sic.) which 
prevents the use of a probit or logit model. 
A.6 First Stage 
Table 4. First stage of the regression on unemployment length in the first post-exit year 
 
France Germany 
 
Sec. Educ. Higher Educ. Sec. Educ. Higher Educ. 
   
  
 Apprenticeship rate 0.57*** 0.83* -0.43*** 0.77*** 
 
(0.07) (0.43) (0.14) (0.23) 
Gender 0.16*** 0.03*** 0.04* 0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) 
Age -0.07 0.10***   
 
 
(0.06) (0.01)   
 Age2 0.00** -0.00***   
 
 
(0.00) (0.00)   
 Father is French or born in France/German or born in Germany 0.11*** 0.01* 0.03 0.04 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) 
Father worker - REF. = o, - -   
 
   
  
 Farmer 0.06*** 0.02 -0.19* - 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.10) 
 Craftsman, Shopkeeper or Business Owner 0.06*** 0.02** -0.03 -0.11** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
Manager, Engineer, Profession or Professor 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.07 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) 
Technician, Supervisor, Sales Rep, Intermediate Professions 0.00 0.01 -0.06* -0.06 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) 
Employee 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.08 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.11) 
Retired -0.03** -0.01 0.00 -0.16* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.08) 
N/A 
  
-0.06 -0.05 
   
(0.05) (0.07) 
Exit after a CAP - REF.  
  
  
 
   
  
 Exit after a BEP -0.50*** 
 
  
 
 
(0.02) 
 
  
 Exit after a Bac. Pro. or a Brevet Pro. -0.52*** 
 
  
 
 
(0.02) 
 
  
 Exit after a BTS or DUT - REF.  
  
  
 
   
  
 Exit after university 
 
-0.10***   
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(0.02)   
 Exit after a 'grande école' 
 
-0.07***   
 
  
(0.02)   
 Exit after university - REF 
  
  
 
   
  
 Exit after a Fachhochschule 
  
  0.05 
   
  (0.04) 
Younger than 11 in 6ème -0.01 -0.00   
 
 
(0.02) (0.01)   
 Older than 11 in 6ème -0.06*** -0.01*   
 
 
(0.01) (0.01)   
 Gymnasium - REF 
  
  
 Realschule 
  
0.09*** 0.35*** 
   
(0.03) (0.05) 
Hauptschule 
  
0.12*** - 
   
(0.03) 
 N/A or drop-out 
  
0.11 - 
   
(0.09) 
 Small Town - REF. = o, - -   
 
   
  
 Medium city -0.00 -0.01* -0.07** -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
Large city -0.04*** -0.02** 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
N/A 
  
-0.01 0.06 
   
(0.05) (0.07) 
Children 0.05** 0.03** 0.03 0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
Women with children 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.06 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Unemployment rate -1.04** 0.28 0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.47) (0.39) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.65 -1.18*** 1.07*** -0.47** 
 
(0.64) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) 
Observations 18,217 25,673 1,005 478 
First stage F-statistic 184.6 17.92 9.592 11.63 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel and Enquêtes Génération, own calculations. 
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